The 1990s brought with them much hope for a new order in the Middle East that would be achieved through peace between Israel and its neighbors. But in the second half of the decade the peace process slowed down (under Netanyahu's government), and then was reignited during the short tenure of Ehud Barak as prime minister, only to collapse into another violent struggle between Israel and the Palestinians, known as the second intifada. Our question this week is therefore:
Did Arafat make a good or poor decision in launching the second intifada in the second half of 2000? Could there have been a better outcome for the Palestinians had he not done so?
I think it would have better if the second intifada were not launched in September 2000. Obviously it would have been better because of the lives that may have been spared, but also for the peace process. Support in Israel for a moderate peace with Palestine was ruined, as many Israelis felt betrayed when there was an attempt for peace. Israel evacuated the Gaza strip but it is now a very unstable region (it has brought a lot of international attention over the years but it does not seem to be helping). Mahmoud Abbas said in 2004 that the intifada had been a mistake and stated; “An examination [of the matter] shows that Sharon did not fall. On the contrary, he has become the most popular [leader] in the history of Israel, after having been subjected to condemnations in Israel. On the same note, all of the Palestinian lands are now occupied and vulnerable, and the settlements have nearly doubled. We damaged our relations with the Americans and with Israeli public opinion” (www.mideastweb.org). In retrospect it is easy to say that it was a poor decision by Arafat and things could probably have gone better for the Palestinians without the second intifada.
ReplyDeleteArafat made a poor choice in launching the Second Intifada in the September 2000. One of the consequences of launching the Second Intifada was the resignation of Ehud Barak and subsequent election Ariel Sharon. While many Arab leaders hoped that they would have better luck in establishing a peace with Israel with Sharon as the prime minister, this has proved untrue. Their logic was that if Sharon, as a conservative, were to support a peace agreement, then the Israelis would support it. In 2002, Arab countries introduced the Arab Peace Initiative, which included what Ehud Barak agreed to when he and Arafat met at Camp David in 2000, in exchange for entire Arab League signing the peace agreement and establishing formal relations with Israel. Yet, Sharon has failed to acknowledge the significance of this initiative and has not agreed to it. The Second Intifada also further divided Arabs and Israelis by provoking Arab citizens of Israel to protest as well, due to the discrimination they suffered, even as Israeli citizens. The only successful result the Intifada could have produced for the Palestinians would be to bring further attention to their cause, however any attention they did receive was not positive. I am reluctant to claim that a better outcome could have occurred had the Second Intifada not been launched. Barak had and Arafat had the opportunity to establish peace, yet disagreements over thee issue of the right of return prevented this from happening. Nonetheless, future negotiations between Barak and Arafat may have produced a settlement.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Katie. I believe that Arafat made the wrong decision with the initiation of the second intifada. Prime Minister Barak was willing to make highly controversial concessions at the Camp David Summit in July 2000 in the hopes of finally establishing peace between Israelis and Palestinians. With all the cards laid out on the table, all Barak asked for in return was for Arafat to officially claim an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict; however, Arafat refused to sign any peace agreements because the “right of return” was not included and he did not want to receive any backlash from the other Arab countries. In my mind, the outcome of Camp David does not justify the second intifada. Arafat had a good deal and he turned it down. Therefore, the second intifada did not achieve any gains for the Palestinians; instead, it only led to the resignation of Ehud Barak and heightened Israeli resentment and scorn, ultimately pushing the hopes of peace off the table.
ReplyDeleteI am unsure that the Palestinians would have had a better outcome, but I believe that they would not have been worse off. If anything, the status quo would have continued and Israelis and Palestinians would have kept going back and forth over peace prospects, but at least this scenario would not have fueled the same hatred as the second intifada had produced.
While I agree with the previous posts that the second intifada was a mistake, I think that its damaging effects were more internal. Rashid Khalidi describes this period as exhausting and debilitating to Palestinian society. While there was relief at the passing of ‘Arafat, the Palestinians were also void of a leader and figurehead for their movement. Although ‘Arafat may have stayed in power too long and lost sight of a vision or goal, a power vacuum is never ideal. He was seen as the father of the Palestinian movement and his absence created great insecurity. ‘Arafat’s illness and subsequent death are not derived from the second intifada, but his passing was impeccably timed – in a moment of great pressure that necessitated strong leadership. Without this leadership, Hamas and Fatah vied for power. Defense against Israeli attacks was stifled by internal attacks. The Palestinian Authority was not organized, trained, nor did it have the arms to stand against the IDF; furthermore, the internal conflicts during the second intifada seriously undermined any opportunities to make military advancements against Israel. ‘Arafat may have seen the second intifada as a chance to regain legitimacy, but the political issues amongst the Palestinians only further undermined their cause.
ReplyDeleteI agree with Natalie in that the negative consequences of the al-Aqsa Intifada were mainly internal. Specifically, I think that the economic consequences of the Second Intifada did nothing to help the Palestinians build up institutions that would provide the foundation for a future state. The general strikes and the never ending cycle of violence between Palestinians wrecked the Palestinian GDP as well as the Israeli economy. Yet unlike Israel, the Palestinians were not able to absorb the shock.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, I don't think that Arafat and the Palestininas had any other alternative to the Intifada. The peace process started at Oslo was effectively dead along with one of its main proponents Yitzhak Rabin. Although Netanyahu and Ehud Barak continued the talks they were not really willing to offer the Palestinians statehood. Although Barak offered Arafat a lot of land and other concession at Camp David these were all conditional on Arafat's promise to declare the Arab-Israeli conflict officially concluded. However, Arafat rejected the deal because the Palestinians were still holding out on the hope that they would get a free state in the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. In light of these goals Barak's offer was not adequate and Arafat decided to launch the Intifada. Although the Intifada didn't help the Palestinians establish a state, at that time the peace process wasn't likely to produce a free Palestinian state either.
I think Arafat made a very poor decision in launching the second intifada in the second half of 2000. He made a terrible decision in launching a militant struggle against a country that boasted a well equipped and trained military; some Palestinian factions’ use of guerilla warfare and suicide bombings show that a sense of desperation, not a concrete goal, guided the intifada. Israel’s superior military used bull dozers to level some buildings in dangerous areas, severely damaging the effectiveness of the Palestinian guerillas’ efforts. The intifada followed the failure of the Camp David Summit of 2000, where Israel was willing to provide considerable concessions to the Palestinians; I think Arafat was foolish for walking out on this summit, especially because of an unrealistic expectation that Israel would accept the return of what is now millions of expatriate “Palestinians.” I agree with Amy Hicks when she said, “the outcome of Camp David does not justify the second intifada.” I think that, if one considers the intifada to be a reaction to the summit’s failure, it is a reaction that symbolizes the Palestinians’ frustration with the actions of Arafat. Arafat’s refusal of the proposed terms because Israel would not accept “the right of return” of all people who claim to be Palestinian reminds me of the Arabs’ refusal of the United Nations Partition Plan for Palestine from 1947; because the Arabs were not willing to compromise (even with what seemed “unfair” concessions), they ended up getting nowhere as far as getting an independent country goes.
ReplyDeleteHad the Second Intifada been properly timed, it could have benefited the Palestinians under the right circumstances. That being said, Arafat did not time the Intifada correctly, nor were the circumstances such that a favorable outcome could have been reached. Arafat made a very poor choice in launching the Second Intifada when he did for multiple reasons.
ReplyDeleteFirst, we know Arafat walked away from the table over two issues, the right of return and an unwillingness to sign a final agreement. Had he been willing to capitulate on the right of return and agree to generate a workable solution to the problem, Israel might have returned the favor by agreeing to further negotiations, giving Arafat the opportunity to make his case for right of return at a later date. Second, had Arafat agreed to a deal with the Israelis, he could have used his new-found political capital to do one of two things. He could have either: A) co-opted HAMAS into forming a coalition with FATAH and created a stronger unit with which the Israelis would have had to negotiate, or B) used the high amount of public approval to paint HAMAS as the true extremists and excise them from the political equation, which would have gained FATAH both more followers among the Palestinians and more goodwill from the Israeli negotiators.
Overall, I think the Second Intifada was a decent backup plan which was prematurely executed and turned into a huge mistake for Arafat.
I agree with Natalie, Parker, Tiegen and Evan. Though the 2nd Intifada would have helped out Arafat and the PLO a ton if it actually worked, it was a huge disaster because poor execution and horrible timing by Arafat.
ReplyDeleteIn 2000 the scene was this according to Rashid Khalidi: Arafat was a old, sickly man (who died not soon after in 2004, the PLO did not have a solid leader or powerful leadership, Israel was not really interested in negotiating because of PM Barack and Netanyahu's strong conservative views and the Palestinians were not all united as much as they should be. All of this meant that the PLO was in pretty bad shape. Hamas and Fatah were vying for power and influence in the Palestinian Authority. Arafat basically was trying to control a mess that was both occurring from within and from outside.
Therefore, Arafat thought it might be a good time to launch yet another Infitada... thinking it would work better than the first on in 1987. This was a miscalculation by Arafat that would cost him because it caused a much greater rift between internal factions, mainly Hamas and Fatah. The Israel leaders mainly, PM Barak started to decline any negotiations and even put a freeze on the diplomatic relations.
Again the PLO and Israel were in a tough bind and the 2nd Infitada only made it all worse.
To make matters worse for the PLO and Arafat...the Israelis were started to negotiate with the PLO in PM Barack's government but because of the 2nd Intitada being launched in September 2000 relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority began to degenerate.
ReplyDeleteThe fact that the 2nd Infitada was even launched showed that the Palestinian leaders, many the PLO and Arafat did not have faith in Israel and in the current negotiations between the two entities. The Israeli leaders must of been highly offended by such a notion and in fact were to the extent that they cut off relations for a good while afterwards. Arafat had not really planned what to do if the 2nd Infatada did not succeed in accomplishing his goals. Finally, after Arafat realized that the Infitada was not going to pressure Israel to negotiate and give into his demands, he recalled it. It was all took late unfortunately for him because relations soured and the peace process took a unnecessary detour; in fact the peace process was put on a dead halt for a few months or so. The 2nd Intifada might have seemed like an excellent idea at the time but it really was not conducive to the Palestinian people or the Israeli people.
Since the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada and its emphasis on suicide bombers deliberately targeting civilians riding public transportation (buses), the Oslo Accords are viewed with increasing disfavor by the right-wing Israeli public.
ReplyDeleteIn May 2000, seven years after the Oslo Accords and five months before the start of the al-Aqsa Intifada, a survey by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at the Tel Aviv University found that 39% of all Israelis support the Accords and that 32% believe that the Accords will result in peace in the next few years. In contrast, the May 2004 survey found that 26% of all Israelis support the Accords and 18% believe that the Accords will result in peace in the next few years; decreases of 13% and 16% respectively. Furthermore, later survey found that 80% of all Israelis believe the Israel Defense Forces have succeeded in dealing with the al-Aqsa Intifada militarily. So according to this information the al-Aqsa Intifada was a major mistake doesn’t matter if it was in 2000 or any other time. It lowered the Israeli peoples support for peace which would’ve hopefully increased and peace would’ve have been achieved by now.
Arafat’s decision to launch a second intifada was a wrong one indeed as the majority of my classmates have also stated in their posts. However, I believe his first mistake was his failure to sign the Camp David Accords at the Middle East Peace Summit. This intisified the conflict through the rise of the “Al-Aqsa Intifada” and eltimately led to several clashes between resulting in many Palestinian and Israeli casualties. Additionally, the resignation of Ehud Barak did not prove to be advantegeous for the Palestinians, he had been willing to negotiate a peace between the two countries despite the negative criticism that came with that. After Barak resigned, Sharon came into power and began to annex more territory within the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem. If Arafat accepted the provisions of the peace agreement offered at Camp David in 2000 the results for the Palestinians could have been more favorable for the Palestinians than an “intensified Israel’s [Israeli] domination over the occupied West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem.” (Khalidi, 205). Not only did Palestine suffer from more violence but it now had driven prospects of peace, or at least a co-existence, with Israel even further away.
ReplyDeleteWhile the Second Intifada is credited with setting into motion the resignation of Ehud, followed by the election Ariel Sharon, it was in no way a success. Arafat was sick and old, and many believed separated from the movement as a whole. The PLO was lacking strong leadership and vision (Khalidi).
ReplyDeleteI think it is interesting to note that the PLO had the plans in place for the Second Intifada just in case the July Camp David talks broke down, which they eventually did. This seems to create 2 conflicting ideas in my mind. First, Arafat was being stupid and not really committing to talks, because he knew he had a violent plan waiting if he didn’t get exactly what he wanted (mostly right of return). Second, it seems brilliant that Arafat had a back-up plan ready to go (the Second Intifada). So I’m not sure if it’s brilliant or stupid to have the Second Intifada plans in your back pocket.
After the Camp David talks broke down, the Intifada started, and then Barak resigned, Ariel Sharon was elected the new prime minister. Arafat had believed Sharon would be easier to negotiated peace with, so the PLO thought this would be an awesome accomplishment, but quickly they found Sharon was not what they expected or wanted. His stance was much firmer than Barak’s, and it only intensified as the violence grew.
This reminds me of something my dad used to say when I was competing athletically in high school. There were a few girls from other schools that I competed against in several different sports throughout the year. Their talent and having to face them repeatedly frustrated me, but my dad explained it was better to know that they were going to be there, than to not know what to expect from a "random or faceless" competitor. I knew how these girls played and could really prepare myself for it, but with new, unknown competition I was at a disadvantage because I had no idea what to expect or how to best prepare. I think the PLO needed my dad to offer that advise pre-Second Intifada. They knew Barak, but thought they knew what to expect from Sharon. Turns out they were completely wrong and had an even harder person with which to deal.
Not to sound like a broken record, but I think there could have been a better outcome if the Palestinians had used the time and resources they were planning and allotting for the Second Intifada instead for redefining their vision and how they wanted to get there. Then, they should have brought new leadership in to be briefed and trained by the experienced, but old, ‘dinosaurs’ (like Arafat). The mixing of experience with new leadership and vision could have helped significantly. Enough can't be said for organization and vision.