The war of 1948 ended with a clear Israeli victory. Historically, military conflicts have many times ended not only with a ceasefire, but actually with a peace treaty. The Israelis expected that this would happen after 1948, yet despite various attempts to negotiate in the late 1940s and early 1950s, no Arab state made peace with Israel. Our question is therefore:
Why didn't Israel sign a peace treaty with its Arab neighbors in the aftermath of the 1948 war?
If you are taking this course for credit, please consult D2L before answering this week's question.
The traditional view in the Israeli narrative is that Israel was willing to sign a comprehensive peace settlement and that the Arab states were completely opposed to signing any treaty that would explicitly recognize the right of Israel to exist. Thus, the official historiography places most, if not all, of the blame on Arab leadership for the failure to reach a permanent settlement.
ReplyDeleteOn the other hand, Revisionist historians have provided enough evidence from Israeli archives to debunk or at least qualify the traditional Israeli narrative. Itamar Rabinovich points out that Arab leaders such as Husni Zaim of Syria made overtures of peace to Israel but that Israeli leadership did not them very seriously. According to Avi Shlaim, at one point during the armistice negotiations Husni Zaim proposed the conclusion of a comprehensive peace treaty that included the normalization of economic and diplomatic relations and the settlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria. In return, Zaim demanded half of the shore of the Sea of Galilee. However, Ben-Gurion rejected Zaim's offer saying that the Syrians had to first sign an armistice agreement before concluding a peace settlement.
In short, Israel was not as determined to reach a peace settlement as the traditional Israeli narrative states. In reality, Ben-Gurion and other Israeli ministers were quite content with the status quo and not readily willing to make substantial compromises for the sake of a final settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Although I agree with Parker’s evaluation of the traditional Israeli narrative and the reality of Ben-Gurion’s dismissal of opportunities for a peace settlement, the political conditions inside neighboring Arab countries further hindered progress to such an agreement. 1948’s defeat was referred to as al-nakba, or the catastrophe. This loss shook the Arab world and undermined the legitimacy of the leaders in these states. Henceforth, defeat ushered in sudden political change. Military coups took place in Egypt, Syria, and later in Iraq. And although no revolution followed, King Abdallah of Jordan was assassinated.
ReplyDeleteThese changes were accompanied by the Arab-Israeli conflict pressing itself to the forefront of Middle Eastern politics. Despite its significance in the political discourse, the new changes in leadership required a more internal focus on dealing with the issue. New regimes or new leaders were focused on maintaining stability within their own state after the debilitating loss, as opposed to initiating diplomatic and peaceful conversations with Israel.
Israel’s distaste for bargaining with their contenders after a war in which they prevailed and attained more territory is evident; there are similar indicators of Arab regimes’ hesitancy to negotiate as well. But in spite of these facts, the political conditions in these Arab states caused by al-nakba did not cultivate opportunities in which Arab leaders could participate in such settlements with the support of their people. Furthermore, foreign relations in any manner were not possible without a successful transfer of power to a new regime. Conclusively, the stir in Israel’s neighboring states constituted the most significant hindrance to a peace settlement because it stood in the way whether political leaders on either side of the Arab-Israeli conflict actually desired such a settlement or not.
I will concede that the Arab leadership, as Natalie points out, also missed opportunities to sign a peace treaty and were hesitant or unwilling to negotiate with Israel. Many of the Arab leaders such as King Abdullah, al-Hinnawi and Shishakli had very little legitimacy in the eyes of the people and thus it was impossible for them to openly endorse negotiations with Israel. On the other hand, the release of archival documents has proven that there were secret diplomatic channels between Israel and its Arab neighbors and that the Jordanian monarchy and even Nasser for a brief period was open to negotiations with Israel. Therefore, it is clear that despite the Arab taboo of establishing any contacts with Israel, in practice Arab leaders realized the need for low-level talks.
ReplyDeleteMoreover, one of the main reasons for Arab hesitancy to open endorse a final settlement with Israel was IDF reprisals on the Jordanian and Egyptian borders. Despite the Jordanian monarchy’s efforts to keep Palestinian refugees and other Arab militants from crossing over the border Israel consistently launched excessive reprisals that often inflicted more casualties than Arab incursions. In the light Israeli’s excessive military reprisals and the hardening of Arab public opinion it was impossible for Arab rulers to endorse conclude a peace settlement even if they wanted to. Thus, I still maintain that the Israeli government deserves the most responsibility for the failure to conclude a final peace settlement.
If none of the countries can uphold the Armistice Agreements of 1949, then what motive does that give any country to enter into a peace agreement? Violations of the armistices by all parties was a common occurrence, whether it was small Palestinian guerilla missions or an ignorance of boundary lines, in the case of Syria and Israel, and lead to a tense climate that was not conducive to official peace negotiations.
ReplyDeleteArab leaders inability to make diplomatic advances because of the fear of arousing objections from the country’s public or other Arab countries made formal and public peace negotiations with Israel taboo. Arab leaders’ unwillingness to publicly negotiate paired with Israel resistance to giving back acquired land were two situations that Michel Oren believes hindered the creation of a peace treaty between Israel and the Arab countries.
First, let it be known that of the five Arab states that were involved in the 1948 war with Israel, only two have made peace with Israel to date. Egypt signed a peace treaty in 1979, and Jordan in 1994. I am sure this topic is not one of Iraq's current priorities, as they are in a bit of a quagmire right now. Also, Israel is having many complications with Hezbollah in Lebanon, so that is not looking promising.
ReplyDeleteNone of the nations involved in the 1948 war should be very proud with the diplomacy (or lack of) that followed the war. At the time, Syria was committed to Arab nationalism and the Palestinian cause. Negotiations between Syria and Israel were scarce. Husni Zaim and Ben-Gurion were fairly close to peace at one point, but in the end neither could agree on a compromise due to the issue of Syrian troops west of the international line on Lake Tiberias. In 2006, Syrian and Israeli diplomats met in Europe and discussed the possibility of peace. Syria agreed that if Israel withdrew from the Golan, then Syria would stop its backing of Hamas. This obviously did not go over well, as I was in Israeli controlled Golan this past summer. The problem of land disputes seems to never get resolved.
Western diplomats were also of little help. They were primarily concerned with getting an armistice signed, and once that was accomplished they were in no hurry to get the peace treaty done. As long as the West could help in getting an armistice signed, absolute peace could come later.
In Egypt, Nasser was rising as an Arab hero in the 1950s. He was widely known for dealing with the West and pressing for Arab gains. The 1956 Suez Campaign also did not help the cause for peace. Jordan seemed to be the only state who came out of the 1948 war with actual gains. Only time will tell whether peace will be achievable between the other nations.
From Israel’s perspective, it is the Arabs fault that there were no peace treaties signed, as the Arab states refused to sign anything that would show their recognition of the state of Israel. With the Israeli victory limits on Jewish immigration were lifted and the numbers rocketed. As Kramer says on page 322, this increased the pressure on the government and they had to become even less willing to compromise.
ReplyDeleteIvan Rabinovich takes another stance, that Israeli leaders were also to blame. Rabinovich talks about the negotiations with Syria. With Syria negotiations were thought to be difficult as Syria was “particularly committed to Arab nationalism and to the Arab cause in Palestine” (Rabinovich p.65). Syria had not, unlike Egypt and Jordan, established communications with Israel towards the end of the war, and so it was suprising when Husni Zaim started armistice negotiations on the 5th of April 1949. Israel had reasons for wanting to sign peace treaties, including putting a final end to the war and confirming their existence as a state. However they felt no need to make concessions with Syria as they had a strong advantage over them. The armistice agreement was signed July 20th, 1949. Rabinovich points out that some Arab leaders, like Husni Zaim, did attempt peace but Israel did not take it very seriously at all. Ben Gurion and others seemed quite satisfied with the balance of power at the time and did not take any drastic steps towards peace with Arab states.
Israel’s failure to sign a peace treaty with its Arab neighbors in the aftermath of the 1948 war was the result of several factors. As Natalie has briefly pointed out, some of these factors were internal problems within the Arab states; others involved both the Arab states and Israel.
ReplyDeleteIn the early 1950s, the governments of the Arab states who had signed the General Armistice Agreement (GAA) were undergoing power struggles; Syria’s dictator Husni Za’im was executed, King ‘Abdallah of Jordan was assassinated, and King Faruq of Egypt was deposed by Muhammad Naguib, who in turn was deposed by Gamel Abdel Nasser. Leaders were worried primarily with the power balance within their states. For example, as Michael Oren states in SIX DAYS WAR, Nasser chose to keep the conflict with Israel “in the icebox.”
Although the Arab general public saw the Jewish state as “abhorrent,” and Arab leaders acted belligerently towards it in the public sphere, many of the leaders clandestinely negotiated with Israel. Arab demands in these peace negotiations usually involved concessions of land (such as Syria’s claim to half of the Sea of Galilee and King Faruq’s claim to the Negev Desert). Israel refused to give up any land, preferring instead to keep the land in order to “develop its structure, absorb immigrants, and gather strength.” Even before Israel refused to compromise in this manner, the Arab states refused to recognize Israel as a state. The GAA itself denied Israel any form of recognition, while giving the Arab states the right to renew hostilities. As long as the Arab states refused to acknowledge Israel’s existence, they were unable to deal with it in any formal way, complicating peace negotiations.
In addition to the political environment, peace negotiations were also influenced by military activities by both the Israelis and the Arabs. Under Nasser, Egypt was sponsoring Palestinian guerillas by 1953. In 1954, Egypt seized an Israeli ship in the Suez canal. Later, Israeli agents vandalized some public institutions in Egypt. Nasser increase his support of guerillas, and a cycle of military confrontations between Israel and Egypt followed.
Israel, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria share responsibility for the failure to develop a peace treaty following the end of the 1948 war. Israel was unwilling to negotiate with the countries that had invaded Israel, and also dismissed the efforts Arab leaders, such as Husni Zaim of Syria, did make for peace. At the end of the 1948 war, Israel was not satisfied with the amount of land they had gained, this mindset prevented the possibility of any concessions Israel could make to Arab countries that would encourage a peace treaty.
ReplyDeleteAs Natalie mentioned, the Arab countries were also reluctant to come to a peace agreement due to the necessity of maintaining stability in their respective countries. In a region and time period that coups and assassinations were not out of the ordinary if an Arab leader were to engage in a peace treaty with Israel they would be risking the possibility of being killed, or losing power. The rise of Arab nationalism under Egyptian leader, Gamal Abdul Nasser, also made it difficult for Arab leaders to engage in serious negotiations with Israel.
At the end of the 1948 war, the Arab states which were weak even before entering the war were defeated and embarrassed by the Israeli victory, and neither side trusted the other. This in combination with the “all-or-nothing” demands of Israel and the Arab states made negotiations for a peace agreement difficult, if not impossible. While ideology and public opinion played a role in hindering negotiations, Rabinovich’s description of Husni Zaim and the negotiations between Syria and Israel during Zaim’s rule shows that there were other contentious issues regarding security and resources—mainly land and water. Even so, Pan-Arab Nationalism and Zionism exacerbated each issue that Zaim and Ben-Gurion ran into during negotiations. Furthermore, Ben-Gurion and Zaim had different intentions and expectations in negotiating with each other. For example, in the beginning, Zaim was more enthusiastic about solving the Arab-Israeli issue while Ben-Gurion saw initial negotiations as part of a long process. However, in the end, disagreements and quarrels such as those over which Israeli leaders were equal in rank to Syrian leaders and vise versa, made Zaim less enthusiastic about signing a peace agreement with Israel right away, and so with the overthrow of Zaim, Israel lost one of several opportunities for peace with its Arab neighbors.
ReplyDeleteIn 1947, the Jews accepted a partition plan that the Palestinians rejected, which had given the Palestinians half of what is now Israel, the Jews were given the other half, but Jerusalem was left neutral. The situation for Palestine had looked more positive before the war, so when the Jews ended up winning the War of 1948, negotiations were very hard to deal with because many Arab countries refused to recognize the legitimacy of the existence of Israel. Along with their lack of desire to recognize Israel as legitimate, countries involved in the War of 1948 were undergoing power struggles of their own, putting any leader who was willing to look “weak” and compromise with Israel in a situation where their power could be easily usurped by someone looking to take their place as leader of their respective country. The last ceasefire agreement was signed with Syria in 1949, which left what is now the northern part of Israel still with a majority Arab population. In the time following the War of 1948, the Palestinian problem of an excess of refugees was getting worse in the countries surrounding Israel, so if the states surrounding Israel chose not to recognize the legitimacy of the new country, they would not have to acknowledge the problem of the refugees who had been displaced by the problem.
ReplyDeleteNow, Israel only has peace agreements with 2 states, but it took almost 30 years to sign even one agreement, which is an apt example of the lack of ability to compromise on many of the issues at present.
The 1948 war came to a close with Israel possessing the upper hand. To pursue peace with its surrounding Arab neighbors would have been an obvious next step; however, the state of Israel did not do so.
ReplyDeleteProspects for peace could have been discussed and were to some extent as Rabinovich mentioned in “The Road Not Taken.” It is evident that Ben-Gurion and the Israeli leadership did have contact with Syrian leader Husni Zaim, which did not end in a peace agreement but was one of the closest ends to peace made by Israel and a neighboring Arab country since the 1948 war.
Similarly in Avi Shlaim’s article “Israel and the Arab coalition in 1948,” Shlaim also discussed Ben-Gurion’s relations with Zaim of Syria, which ended in Ben-Gurion rejecting Zaim’s offer. It is my opinion that Ben-Gurion chose to reject the what would have been a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement because he would have had to concede land to the Syrians.
Time and time again, Ben-Gurion sought to obtain more land for Israel, which was evident far before the close of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war. One specific example of this, however, was the launch of Plan D by Israel in March of 1948. The purpose of Plan D was relatively simple: to gain as much land as possible before the British left in May of 1948 -- whether that was land allotted to Israel or Palestine under the Partition Plan.
To have signed a peace treaty, or multiple for that matter, after the war would have forced the Israeli leadership into a place where they would not have had the freedom to possibly increase the size of Israel. Obviously simply because they signed a peace treaty wouldn’t have meant they had to abide by it -- agreements are frequently broken. But legally/technically/however you want to put it, they would have been held to the standard set in the treaty.
As others have mentioned previously, the lack of a peace treaty was not completely at the fault of the Israeli leadership.
The Arab states and leaders who had made up the Arab League were very divided. Shlaim specifically addresses this in his article discussing Israel and the Arab coalition. They were divided before the war, and during the war, Israel’s leaders were fully aware of the divisions and “exploited these divisions to the full in waging war and in extending the borders of their state” (Shlaim 81).
Furthermore, because each of the surround Arab states had been so focused on its own interests during the war, it would have been incredibly difficult for Israel to make differing terms of peace with each individual state. Also, because Arab states were still interested in obtaining land in the Levant, if they were to pursue peace with Israel, they too would be unable to pursue their own interests in the area, as well.
Neither Israel or any Arab nation saw peace treaty as a real option for them right after the War of 1948. In fact, the Arab nations wanted nothing to do with Israel but to annihilate it. Although, 2 nations later did make peace with Israel: Jordan in 1994 and Egypt in 1979, during the 1950s and 1960s the Arab nations did not because they were too proud.
ReplyDeletePan-Arabism and Pan-Islamism had started to take root in the 1950s because of many influencial leaders i.e. Gamal Abd al-Nasser, various Syrian leaders, etc. The idea that any Arab nation would sign any sort of treaty with Israel was not an option because it would be social and political suicide.
On the Israeli side it was almost the same situation. Israel had just destroyed a coalition of 4 Arab nations in 1948 and was not about to give into any sort of treaties. The Israeli leaders were also extremely proud so they did not feel like they needed to make peace immediately. They also felt that they had the upper hand by winning in the war and used non-negotiations as leverage. Unfortunately, this kind of mentality or strategy was not conducive for either side, as there would be many more wars to come, causing only determent, grief and frustration.
The failure to establish a peace treaty after the war of 1948 lie in the hands of Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Israel.
ReplyDeleteThe loss of the war of 1948 undermined the capability and legitimacy of the leaders in Arab countries, making it difficult for those countries to make any political agreement with Israel. Maintaining stability within their government and state was the primary goal for the new leaders in the Arab states, putting diplomatic relations with Israel aside. With the need for positive public opinion, Arab states were unwilling and afraid to publicly negotiate with Israel.
According to Avi Shlaim, Husni Zaim proposed a peace treaty that included normalization of economic and diplomatic relations, and the settlement of 300,000 Palestinian refugees in Syria. In return, Zaim asked for half of the Galilee. Ben-Gurion rejected this offer. Israel wanted to keep the land it had gained in order to continue the development of the Israeli state.
Israel needed all of the land it had gained to ensure more absorption of Jewish immigrants and to ensure that the Israeli state would continue to grow stronger. The final armistice agreement was signed in July of 1949. Israeli groups such as the Socialist Mapam Party recognized that injustice had been done and were in favor of the Arab right of return. However, more than 400 Arab villages were destroyed and abandoned as Kramer points (pg. 322). Villages, houses, fields, and businesses were divided among Jewish immigrants. So this leaves the question of, what did the Arabs have to return to? Ben-Gurion most likely knew that if Arabs returned and saw their property destroyed, they would not have acted in a positive or friendly manner
Overall, the Israelis were satisfied with the results of the war. When Arab states refused to recognize Israel as a state, Israel in return lost interest to compromise. It should be noted that Israel did win the war and did have the upper-hand in the situation. Whether creating an Israeli state was justified or not, the Israelis did win the war of 1948 and really had no obligation to make a peace treaty with the Arab states. As mentioned before, the Arab leaders focus after the war was to create stability within their state. The Israelis therefore, had every right to put emphasis on the development of Israel instead of making peace arrangements with the Arab states.
The blame cannot be put solely on the Arabs or the Israelis. The timing to develop a peace agreement was not right in accordance to the end of the war. All countries had internal struggles to deal with, putting peace agreements at the end of the various leader’s priorities.
I agree with Shelbi but I disagree that it was Jordan, Syria and Egypt jobs' to establish a peace treaty.
ReplyDeleteIn any war, traditionally the victor of the war is suppose to to present a peace treaty although it has not always been that way in history. Nevertheless Israel should have been the one to initiate the peace process because it was out numbered 1 to 4 at least...therefore it would have been wise. But, Israel did not and that would be a crucial mistake that would cost it more blood and lives in the future wars it would have with its neighbors.
It should stated that in all of the wars between Israel and its neighbors, the Arabs were the aggressors so naturally Israel had to defend itself or face annihilation. Obviously the Arabs knew that Israel would not go down without a fight. All Israeli leaders have stated that they will not negotiate with Arab nations so long as those nations are aggressive towards Israel.
I absolutely agree with Shelbi that the Arab nations are to blame for not recognizing Israel, causing Israel to not have any sort of negotiations of diplomatic relations with them: Syria, Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon mostly. Obviously Israel was not going to have relations with nations that would not acknowledge its existence...even if those nations were Israel's neighbors.
Israel had absolutely no room to compromise or negotiate because it was outnumbered 1 to 4 or even more at some points. The USA and UK had to back up Israel and give it help and military supplies at first but now Israel has become a mighty force to be reckon with in the region! Finally, Jordan, Egypt and others began to recognize and even have diplomatic relations with Israel, which most likely caused tensions to somewhat calm and the threat of war to somewhat diminish. Of course paramilitary groups like Hamas, Hizbollah and even nations like Syria and Iran would love to "wipe Israel off the face of the Earth" as the president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would put it.
Unfortunately, all this hostility in the Middle East will continue between Israel and its neighbors for as longs as groups like Hamas, Hezbollah exist. Also, for as long as the Assad regime rules Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran continues to exist. That is just the way it is right now but it will get better when opposing groups come to terms with each other and start having respectful relations with each other. Until then, we can all expect more bloodshed, boycotts, protests, hatred, persecution, massacres, genocide, war and remorse.
I agree with Amy Hicks in that the neglect of the terms set forth in 1949 Armstice Agreements for Israel and its five surrounding Arab neighbors did not provide any country an incentive to reach a peace agreement.
ReplyDeleteThe difficulty in making any diplomatic advances stems from the traditional Zionist perception of their conflict with the Arabs. According to Avi Shlaim in the Israel and Arab coalition in 1948, Israel has often evoked the “biblical image of David and Goliath” (79). The Israeli victory over the five Arab states furthered the idea of “the few against the many.” As a result of this Israel developed a greater amount of pride and confidence which hindered them from seriously viewing any negotiation attempts made by Arab countries.
Take for example, the efforts made by Husni Zaim of Syria to reach a negotiation of borderlands. Israeli explanation of Israeli’s refusal to reach an agreement can be found in an address made by Sharett on May 25, 1949 when he “We will obviously not agree that any part of Palestine be given to Syria, as control of the water sources is at stake.” The word “obviously” implies an unwillingness on the Israeli behalf to comprise over their borders. The American advised that the water line amounted to a more sensical military and political boundary than the present international border. However, Israelis still emphasized that the water lines in question were too economically and socially important to give up. I agree with Rabinovich’s statement “the Israelis missed ‘a unique opportunity to come to a long-term agreement with the Syrians’” (73).
During the War of 1948, Arab states were joined in the goal of keeping the Jews from occupying the land the UN partition granted them. Although they were joined in this, their highest priority was to ensure their rival group members did not get anything more from it than they themselves would (Kramer 309). Once they lost the war, they continued this lack of unity by negotiating armistices separately (Kramer 320).
ReplyDeleteArab states opposed signing any treaty that would explicitly recognize the right of Israel to exist. Without that recognition, Israel would not compromise. Israel had shown their military superiority throughout the War of 1948, so they saw it as better to get their internal affairs in order by preparing for the new immigrants that would soon flood in and establishing a stronger infrastructure (which they had already started pre-1948). Their victory made them feel that there was no reason to seek a compromise with the losing Arabs. They won. They got land. They were happy. Why give it away to those that won’t negotiate with them? (Rabinovich). It was also in Israel’s best interest to keep pushing towards more land.
Arab nations were in a weak place to negotiate from. They hadn’t succeeded in taking land or presenting a real military threat to Israel during the war. Arab nations needed to deal with their own internal affairs as well. As Kramer explains, the defeat in the war sparked drastic political change. Syria, Egypt, and Iraq faced military coups and Jordan’s King Abdallah was assassinated. The intensified pressure showed Arab leaders that seriously negotiating with Israel, instead of taking a hard, “all-or-nothing”, no compromise, stance, was going to be political death (which in the Middle East translates to physical death quite often). Arab civilians wanted no compromise, and their leaders listened (Kramer 322).
Another important fact that has been mentioned already is that the ceasefires were continually broken. Breaking ceasefire agreements does not do much to make your opponent want to sit down at a table to negotiate. They have no reason to trust you or anything you’re offering. This lack of trust breaks down any chance that could exists.
Israel had a military advantage over its neighbors and without a serious threat, had no reason to make land concessions to Arab countries. Unsatisfied with the current distribution of land, David Ben Gurion set his sights towards a future of acquisition. The goal of expanded the Zionist state had not room to relinquish land. Stalling the peace process meant the opportunity to obtain greater territory and better leverage to negotiate with.
ReplyDeleteOn the opposed side, the Arab political instability made strong relations unlikely. With Pan-Arabism and nationalism starting to emerge, politicians and rulers were held captive by their populations, embittered and unwilling to accept the existence of the Jewish state. This and the low-level, secret nature that negotiations would have to have been under, makes any reasonable agreement unlikely.
Even if negotiations were started, the Arab nations attempted to mediate peace separately. Since each state would ask for some sort of forfeiture to end hostilities, the total cost of achieving peace with all its neighbors would be far too much for the young Israel to lose. If the Arab combatants kept their alliance through the post-conflict talks, Israeli would have been more open to concessions, gaining multilateral peace.