Saturday, February 19, 2011

Question of the week: the Arab revolt of 1936-39

The Arab revolt of 1936-39 was perhaps the most concentrated attempt to halt Jewish expansion and persuade the British to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine. Our question this week is therefore:

Was the Arab revolt of 1936-39 a success?

Explain your answer and, if you are taking this course for credit, reference the weekly reading in some way. You may read more about the Arab revolt in the following link:


And read the original text of the British White Paper of 1939, which followed the revolt, here:

20 comments:

  1. Although the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 did persuade the British to comply with Palestinian demands for a restriction on Jewish immigration the economic and political repercussion of the revolt left Palestinian society leaderless and weak, allowing the Yishuv to grow grow stronger and ultimately defeat the Palestinians and the Arab States in the 1948 War.

    The Arab demand for restriction on Jewish immigration to Palestine was achieved with the issuing of the British White Paper of 1939 that curtailed the influx of Jewish immigrant to 75,000 over the next five years. Yet, in the long run it was a Pyrrhic victory and the cost was steep: thousands of Palestinians killed or wounded, a weakened economy due to the Arab strike and the exile of Hajj Amin al-Hussein and most of the Palestinian leadership. In any case, the immigration of European Jews continued despite the British White Paper's stipulation and would eventually increase as knowledge of the Holocaust and international pressure forced the British to allow more Jewish immigration to Palestine.

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  2. I agree with Parker, but successful for whom is the real question. The Arabs or Jews? For the Arabs, the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was ultimately, a disaster and their real last hope to get a pure Arab state for themselves and to persuade the British. Never of those hopes became reality.

    The White Paper of 1939 was a repeal of the Peel Commission of 1937. The British made it clear that a one group state would be the only solution the in White Paper of 1939. The partitioning plan would not work because both Jews and Arabs wanted Palestine as their national homeland.

    The Arab Revolt mostly failed because the Jews had the Ha-Haghanah and more firepower than the Arabs did. The Jews were much more organized in military efforts and had more funding than the Arabs. In the end of the Arab Revolt the Arabs had lost and lost badly.

    The Arab Revolt furthermore, did not help the Arabs with securing British favors. In fact, it did the exact opposite. The British began to favor the Jewish side more. Especially after the beginning of WWII the British allowed more Jews to immigrate to Palestine. So ultimately it could be said that the Arab Revolt backfired on the Arabs.

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  3. In response to the previous post, I agree that fruits of success depended on which side of the fence, the Jewish or the Arab, one stood on. For the Arabs, the revolt did not fulfill any substantive or permanent political gains in establishing an Arab state or greatly deterring the Jewish population in their strive for a Palestinian home. Nevertheless, the Arab Revolt was successful in capturing the attention of the British administration and unifying Palestinian Arabs, as well as other Arab countries, which could later be seen as the beginnings of an Arab nationalism.

    Within Palestine, the Arab revolt fueled Arab urban, rural, and elitist actions. Though the three sectors may have had differing or undefined motives, the Arab people; nonetheless, united in the actions of their fellow Arabs to spread and power the revolt. The improvement of education, literacy and communication among the Arabs had minimized the disconnect between social classes, which had been problematic before WWI, and enabled Arabs to mobilize more effectively than before. A more in-depth illustration of the growth of education in the Arab community is illustrated in Reading Palestine, by Ayalon.

    The Peel Commission of 1937 exemplified British’s recognition of an Arab nationality and its grievances within Palestine. The Arab people were no longer ambiguously referenced, like in previous British policies, but were, more or less, a collective entity that rivaled the Jewish nationality. International Arab disdain for the commission revealed Arab nationalism evolving outside the boundaries of Palestine; thus, further fueling the collective Arab revolt.

    Although the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was not successful for Arab’s advancements to largely deterring the Jewish community or ruling the land of Palestine, the collective movement can be seen as building a recognized Arab nationalism.

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  4. The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 prompted the British to issue the MacDonald White Paper, which presented several terms that were advantageous to the Palestinian Arabs. One such term placed a limitation on Jewish immigration over a period of five years, and another placed a restriction on Jewish land purchases. Although both of these terms addressed long-standing demands of the Palestinian population, the Arabs rejected the White Paper.
    The Arabs’ rejection of the White Paper of 1939 represented the widening gap between the nominal leaders of the Arabs and the leaders of the rebel groups in Palestine. All of the Arab governments, and most members of the Arab Higher Committee, were willing to accept the White Paper, yet Hajj Amin al-Husayni managed to persuade the Arab Higher Committee to reject it. According to Khalidi, the Mufti did this as a result of a statement that rebel leaders in Palestine made about the White Paper. In this statement, the rebel leaders called for complete independence for Palestine, and said that the Palestinians were not under the authority of a select group of Arab families or the authority of the Arab kings.
    The rebel leaders gained leadership of the Arab revolt when the Mandate government dissolved the Arab Higher Committee and dismissed the Mufti in 1937. While leadership was in the rebels’ hands, the revolt became even more decentralized, and groups tended to act on a local level. Many wealthy Arabs, who found themselves between the British and rebel groups, fled the country.
    The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 was not a success for the Arabs. Their leaders rejected the White Paper of 1939, which would have met at least two of their demands. The Mandate government started to treat the Arab community more harshly. In 1937 the British imposed the death penalty for the possession of unauthorized weapons, which led to the hanging of 112 Arabs between 1937 and 1939. The British imposed collective punishment on neighborhoods, and blew up houses of people who were suspected of helping the rebels. In contrast, the British assisted the Hagana and permitted the Jews to form armed units that would serve as police auxiliaries.

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  5. The Arab revolt of 1936-39 was unsuccessful and proved a negative outcome for Arab society. Many reasons can explain the ineffectual revolt such as the harsh Mandate government, rejection of the White Papers, and a stronger Jewish economy. Educated sources such as Gudrun Kramer can further explain how the Arab revolt of 1936-39 did not work the Arabs advantage.
    The Jews were allowed by the British to have armed organizations such as the Haganah which only displayed the Arab revolt ineffective of halting Jewish expansion in terms of military. The rejection by Arab leaders of the White Papers of 1939 that would service two of the Arab demands also identifies the unsuccessful Arab revolt. Another example that showed the Arab revolt being ineffective was the rough treatment of Arabs under the Mandate government. The failed Arab revolt of 1936-39 can further be explained by Kramer when he states:

    The Arab economy and society had suffered greatly: Over three years of uprising, several thousand Arabs had been killed and wounded, and many houses, fields, and orchards had been destroyed. The strike, boycott, and armed revolt had ultimately weakened the Arab economy and strengthened the Jewish sector with its plethora of institutions, and deep concern with self-reliance.

    Kramer explains the Arab revolt unsuccessful by drawing attention to economical reasons and the large number of Arab deaths. Also, with WWII taking place in Europe many Jewish immigrants filled many labor positions that Arab strikers forfeited.

    Furthermore, the Arab revolt of 1936-39 proved to be unsuccessful and would ultimately hurt Arab society more than help it. The revolt moved favoritism towards the Jews and by the previously stated examples proved to show that the result of Arab revolt only further disturbed the Arabs. Overall, the result of the Arab revolt was indeed unsuccessful.

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  6. At the close of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39, it seemed as though the Arabs had made a significant impact on British policy. With the release of the MacDonald White Paper published on May 17, 1939, two of three specific points outlined in the assessment of future Jewish-Palestinian relations were seemingly pro-Arab including a fixed limit on Jewish immigration and a restriction of Jewish land purchases. The third point promoted was the creation of a binational Arab-Jewish state. Even this could have been somewhat favorable for the Arab community, in that at least the projected state would be binational; however, both the Arabs and Zionists rejected it.

    While it may have seemed as though this new proposed policy resulted from the Arab Revolt, the reality, as Kramer noted in her history of Palestine, was more so due to the, then current, state of political affairs in Europe. Furthermore, Kramer mentioned, some British observers hoped this would satisfy the Arabs for the time being while British interests were focused elsewhere.

    Additionally, perhaps the determining factor in the demise of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 was rooted in its beginnings -- boycotts, strikes, etc. -- which had ultimately strengthened the Arab economy while bolstering the Jewish economy. While the revolt fostered a sense of nationalism for the Palestinians, it also more tightly united Zionists, as well. Perhaps the most debilitating factor of the entire revolt was the undoing of any serious Arab leadership. For without a secure economy and inexistent leadership, the Arab movement in Palestine would have serious issues building enough support to continue or create an effective movement against the Zionists.

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  7. There are a few points that can be considered when trying to determine whether the Arab revolt of 1936-1939 was a success or a failure. Such as the MacDonald White Paper, published May 17th, 1939, which at first glance was a sign of success of the Arab revolt of 1936-1939. There would be a fixed number of Jewish immigrants allowed, a restriction of Jewish land purchases and an Arab-Jewish state that would become independent within ten years. However, as Kramer points out, it was a failure as it did not satisfy the Arabs and pissed off the Jews.

    On one side the revolt was successful for the Palestinian Arabs as the Mufti and Arab Higher Committee gained more power and the opposition had been weakened. On the other hand the Arab economy took a great blow while the Jewish economy grew and there were large losses of lives and destruction of houses on the Arab side. The Yishuv boomed in power thanks to significant growth in the industrial, agricultural and education sectors, which made the Yishuv a more self-sufficient political society. This was a failure of the revolt for the Arabs, as their power in relations to the Yishuv diminished (Tessler p. 209).

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  8. With any revolt or revolution, it must be understood that while there is sometimes an end goal in mind, the motives often reflect that a group has reached its breaking point and must take a leap of faith to discontinue the current pattern of events. While the Arab Revolt in the beginning saw some success—Khalidi mentions that this revolt was the most successful in its time regarding longevity, especially given the Palestinians’ resources—the Arab Revolt was doomed to fail and the end result crushed any opportunity the Palestinians may have had. The Palestinians were punished and suffered great losses, especially in economics and freedom. Also, since Arab leaders from other countries were, at the time, in negotiations with western powers, and news of the plight of the Palestinians, according to Khalidi was an embarrassment for other Arab counties, they did not support the Palestinians. Furthermore, not only did the Arab Revolt lead to the failures the Arabs faced in the War of 1948, but it also contributed to Western opinion and ideology which continues view Arabs as the radical opposition to Western powers.
    The White Papers cannot be seen as any sort of success for the Palestinians since they did not completely or significantly halt Jewish immigration, or in any other way help the Palestinians. The White Papers were merely an attempt to pacify the Palestinians. Even if they had agreed to the White Papers, I doubt that they would have done anything for the Palestinians.

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  9. While the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 managed to gain some widespread media attention, the lack of organization and clarity of cause, as well as the inability to undo that which had already been done, made the Arab revolt unsuccessful. The Arabs were too late in attempting to gain the loyalty of one another because their sale of land to Jews obviously conveyed that they were more prepared to make a profit off their land than to fight for the protection of it. As Kramer points out in her book, “Jewish purchasers were as a rule prepared to pay a price above market value and the expected yields.” (245)

    A large effort to sequester Arab support was made by local newspapers but even these attempts seemed generally unsuccessful. The First Phase of the revolt was impractical because striking only provided opportunity for newly immigrated Jews to find work filling positions that Arabs protested.

    Also, the Jews had economics on their side, and thus property damages and such caused by random Arab attacks proved to be rather insignificant. They also didn’t lose many men, whereas the Arabs had much more considerable losses due to the presence of the British military at the time. They also incurred huge financial and property damage, which only discouraged them further.

    This revolt solidified tensions between the Arabs and the Jews and therefore marks a significant change in perceptions toward one another. It could be said that the Arabs established some form of identity through this revolt, but overall it was wildly unsuccessful.

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  10. Although it was ultimately crushed by the British, the Arab revolt did send a clear message that if Britain allowed unrestricted immigration and settlement in Palestine, Britain risked driving Arabs into Germany and Italy’s arms. Britain didn’t stop unrestricted immigration completely, but they did make serious attempts to deter illegal immigrants.

    Just because the message was successfully sent to Britain, I don’t believe it was a success for several reasons. The outcome of the 1948 War was shaped by the position in which Arabs found themselves after the Arab revolt of 1936-1938. Many prominent leaders were exiled, deported, jailed, demoralized, imprisoned, or executed. Losing that kind of leadership (as well as young males) in urban and rural areas negatively impacted the future of Arabs. In addition to the Arab lives lost, hundreds of homes, as well as crops, were destroyed. The strike portion of the revolt also opened business opportunities for Jewish businesses. With Arabs on strike, Arab goods and services were replaced by Jewish businesses, which helped situate Jews in a greater economic position that continued to expand.

    Although the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 made Arab demands known, it was not successful.

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  11. The Arab Revolt was, in the long term, unsuccessful in its attempt to prevent the influx of Jews into Palestine. The revolt induced the British address concerns of the Palestinians in the third White Paper, by limiting the number of Jews that could immigrate into Palestine and vaguely acknowledging the right of Palestinians to live in Palestine. However, this limit on Jewish immigration into Palestine was largely ineffective, in light of the oncoming Holocaust, the Ha-Haganah successfully continued to smuggle Jewish immigrants into Palestine.

    Furthermore, the Arab population overestimated how dependent the Jews were on Arab labor. Instead of crippling the Jewish economy, the strikes gave the Jewish population the opportunity to become more self-sufficient. Further exacerbating the plight of the Arabs, was lack of clear leadership and outside support. The British made feeble attempts to prevent Jewish immigration after the publication of the third White paper, while the Palestinians received no support from surrounding Arab nations. The Palestinian cause suffered from weakened economy, feeble leadership, and no outside support, hindering any chance of success the revolt had.

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  12. Considering the initial objectives of the Arab revolt for the Arabs, this revolt was a failure. One of the main proofs of this failure was in the white papers, where British policy on the issue of the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine was expressed and changed. Though the Arabs were able to get a temporary limit on the flow of Jewish immigrants into the area, the Arabs had more of a promising offer in the Peel Commission (with separate states for both parties) whereas the final white paper of 1939 did express that an eventual joint state with Jews and Arabs was going to be a necessity. The revolt of 1936-1939 had two phases, both having different levels of effectiveness for the Arabs in what was British-controlled Palestine. The first phase of the revolt was more calm, a political revolt led by the Higher Arab Committee, where the second phase of the revolt consisted of strikes and increased violence from lower classes. These strikes actually proved to be one of the worst decisions by the Arabs, because the Jews that had just emigrated to Palestine were able to find employment in the jobs that the Arabs had intended to temporarily vacate. This put a strain on the already temperamental Arab economy, and the Jewish economy was obviously aided with the increased employment of the new immigrants.

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  13. To determine whether the Arab revolt of 1936-39-which was led by Husseini's family and Fawzi El Kaukji- against the Jewish immigration -which was in 1935 higher than ever (Kramer)- and the British Mandate was a failure or a success, one should look at the outcome of it. The revolt resulted in both gains and losses from the part of the Arabs. One can say that they only obtained a partial victory with the issuance of the white paper by Mcdonald. Indeed, The white paper was favorable to the Palestinians in the sense that it called for a limitation of Jewish immigration as well as a limitation of their possibility to purchase lands in Palestine. Indeed, a limit of 75,000 Jewish immigrants was set for a five-year period. Moreover, Mcdonald called for the creation of a unified Palestinian state. However, The white paper was not that effective since even though the waves of immigration were suddenly interrupted, the illegal immigration increases. Meanwhile, the Haganah who were supported by the British, was getting more trained and more organized too. The other side of the coin was that the Arabs faced a military, economical and political failure during the revolt. Militarily, many of their leaders either died or decided to exile as opposed to the reinforcement of the Zionist paramilitary strength with the support of the British. Politically, the lack of unity among the Arabs did not make the revolt effective. They did not capture Jewish settlements and the physical losses in the Jewish side was insignificant comparing to theirs. Economically, the strikes launched by the Arabs did not affect the Jews but rather benefited them. Indeed as a result of the economical Arab boycott, the Jews employed their people instead of the Arabs which relieved the Jewish unemployment. Another unfavorable outcome of the revolt to the Palestinians, was the decision of the British to impose, in June 1937, the death penalty for unauthorized possession of weapons in Arab territories.The British confiscated large quantities of arms during and after the revolt which only weakened the Arabs that would cause their loss in the war of 1946. Indeed, between 1937 and 1939, as Kramer pointed out, there were 112 arabs who were hanged for illegal possession of weapons.

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  14. The Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 was not a success. The only significant outcome of the revolt was the MacDonald White Paper issued by Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald, which ended up failing. The White Paper was published on May 17, 1939 and put forth several new ideas. The White Paper included having a fixed limit of Jewish immigration, a restriction of Jewish land purchases to specific areas, and a binational Arab-Jewish state that would become independent within ten years and enter into a new treaty relationship with Great Britain. The Arabs and the Jews were both dissatisfied, and neither accepted the terms. The first phase of the Arab Revolt strengthened the Mufti and the Arab Higher Committee, but on the other hand the Arab economy and society had suffered. Thousands of Arabs were killed and many homes and fields were demolished. As Kramer mentions, wherever Arab employees went on strike, Jews took the initiative to take their place. The loss of lives, farms, and jobs ultimately affected the Arab economy, and therefore made the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 unsuccessful.

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  15. While Kramer claims that the revolt can be credited with signifying the birth of the Arab Palestinian identity, a measure of achievement for the Arabs, the Arab revolt was overall unsuccessful. Not only were hundreds of people killed and a lot of property damaged, but the revolt resulted in increased tensions between both the Jews and Arabs in Palestine and the British and the Arabs in Palestine. The 1939 White Paper was meant to create an independent government for Palestinian Arabs and Jews in proportion to each of their populations and also place limits on both Jewish immigration and land purchases. The Arabs ultimately rejected this because it did not live up to their standards of an agreement. But the White Paper also angered the Zionists because they felt that it was a complete shift of British policy in Palestine, which originally had Great Britain’s financial support. In retaliation, Zionists organized illegal immigration into Palestine. Both the Arab’s rejection of the White Paper and the Zionists illegal immigration allowed the Yishuv to gain power socially, economically, and politically in the area.

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  16. If the success of the Arab-Revolt was solely based on the two goals to halt Jewish expansion (by means of decreasing immigration and land purchases) and persuade British to limit Jewish immigration into Palestine, then it would not be considered a success.
    While the British White Paper of 1939 somewhat successfully in placed a fixed number of Jewish immigrants and restricted Jewish land purchases (keyword being somewhat), they did not completely prevent Jewish immigration. This can be seen in the Ha-Haganah smuggling Jewish-European immigrants escaping the Holocaust. Therefore, Jewish immigration was not completely curtailed.
    The goal was to halt Jewish expansion. Yet, as a result of the Arab-Revolt’s strikes the Jewish economy expanded. It became more self-sufficient and the recent immigrants took the jobs that the Arabs had refused. With the increasing development of the Jewish economy the power of the Yishuv grew as well.
    At the end of the revolt, the Palestinians suffered from an injured economy, a vast amount of death, and the exile of most of its leadership. Ultimately, this lack of organization and severe blows to its economy aided in the Arab State’s defeat in the 1948 War.

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  17. The 1936-1939 Arab revolt could be considered a success only because the Arabs momentarily had regained control of lands that the British controlled per the Mandate of 1923. Once the British regained control of the area, the revolt didn’t seem as impressive. The already unorganized Arabs had acted out of turn. They were not trained well and had little resources to work with. Had they held off on the attacks and rebellions and better organized themselves, they could have coordinated a better plan that would have worked long term.

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  18. The Arab revolt of 1936-39 was not a success. The Arab leadership was scattered and many killed by the British. Tension between Jews and Palestinian Arabs increased. Tensions between the British and Palestinian Arabs also obviously increased. The British government system allowed for an Arab Mufti of Jerusalem. This position could have helped the Arabs unify and establish state institutions much like the Yishuv was doing. While the Arabs did successfully rebel against British authority, long term goals like self-determination and economic prosperity were not realized by the Arab Revolt but actually made less attainable.

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  19. By any and all accounts, the Arab Revolt could not be considered a success. Every attempt by the Arabs to fight against the British mandate was crushed by the British's superior weapons and tactics. There was very little hope from the outset of an Arab victory and subsequent declaration of statehood and the struggle was largely symbolic. The Arabs were the underdog, fighting against the powers that be. They were ill-equipped and poorly organized, with little prospect of ever achieving autonomy.

    The only "victory" was the release of the White Papers, but these were simply an appeasement by the British authority, and it is now clear that they had no intention of enforcing a cap on Jewish immigration or settlement. Doing so was not to the British advantage, and as we have learned in this course, most of these governments care only for themselves and their elite.

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  20. Comment on Misha Goosheh's post:

    I agree with Misha that the Arabs were not trained or organized well enough to present a formidable threat to the British. I think that if they had waited though to organize themselves, oppression and economic depression would have only gotten worse. If the Arabs had waited, the British empire would have eventually let go of Palestine but it would have been more of a question of whether it should go to Arabs or Jews. Because of the Arab Revolt, the Arabs hurt their chances of equal recognition in distributing the land of Palestine after the Mandate ended.

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