Our question this week is one of the most controversial ones in the history of the conflict, so feel free to debate it as much and as long as you wish:
Why did the Yishuv/Israel win and the Palestinians/Israel's Arab neighbors lose in the war of 1948?
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ReplyDeleteThe events preceding the War of 1948 were largely dominated by Jewish efforts, as manifested in the Hagana. Support received from the Jewish population created the conditions for its militant and territorial advances. Palestinian efforts paled in comparison; fragmented groups such as the Arab Liberation Army and the Army of the Holy War not only lacked arms and training but purpose as well.
ReplyDeleteAs Dr. Stein illustrated in his lecture, ownership lies in citizenship. Jews held an ideological purpose and found unity within it. Palestinians were merely “inhabitants” (prior to their outward exodus, which is also evidence that they did not function as a community.) Furthermore, the declaration of “indirect intervention” by the Arab League proves the lack of cohesion among Arab states and the failure of a pan-Arab identity. Whereas Jews were clearly driven concerning their ideological endeavors – they were the foundation of Zionism and forerunners to the Israeli identity.
Prior to Ben-Gurion’s declaration of independence for the state of Israel, militant efforts from both side of the conflict escalated from attacks to conventional warfare, and ultimately to terrorism. Because the Jews had strength on their side (weapons and tactics), the psychological fear imposed by groups like Irgun and LEHI successfully led to an increase in Arabs fleeing Palestine.
By May of 1948, the evolution of the Hagana into the Israeli Defense Force found this new state with an excellent military – 35,000 trained soldiers equipped with an ideological motivation and numbers that skyrocketed to 96,000 by December. Even at the birth of this state, it was already completely modernized. Because of the hands-off nature of the British rule, the Jews had been able to create effective infrastructure and institutions, while all five invading militaries had primarily functioned under imperialist rule, leaving each void of the training to fight for its own nation, much less for a people with which they only shared borders and language.
Although there are multiple factors leading to the success of Israel in the War of 1948, each owes credit to the ideology of Zionism and more specifically, its indoctrination in the hearts of its citizens.
I agree with most of what Natalie says in that the Yishuv was more prepared than the Palestinians military on the eve of the 1947-48 war. The Zionist had acquired not only arms and ammunition smuggled into Palestine throughout the war but also had received military training from the British in the Mandate Period.
ReplyDeleteHowever, I think that in order to understand how the Yishuv prevailed and the Palestinians/Arabs lost we must ask how and why the Zionists possessed a superior military and why the Palestinian resistance failed. I think that the answer lies in the British Mandate period and the Arab Revolt of 1936-39. Although the British distanced themselves from the Zionist movement during WWII throughout most of the Mandate Period the British were supporting the development of the Yishuv economically and politically so that the Zionist were later able to lay down para-state structures and develop a strong military. The Palestinians were not even accorded official status as a nation in the Mandate agreement.
Furthermore, they lacked the patronage of a Great Power such as Great Britain. In fact, right before WWII the British dealt the critical blow to the Palestinian community by crushing the Arab Revolt. As a result, the Palestinians lacked the manpower and leadership to effectively resist the creation of the State of Israel in 1947.
I agree with what has been said by the previous statements. Nevertheless, I believe that the extent to which the Palestinian and Arab forces were divided has been overlooked.
ReplyDeleteThe Palestinian forces were inferior to the Hagana (and subsequently the IDF) in terms of size, armament, and organization. The Palestinian side of the war of 1948 consisted of locally organized forces that had little to no training and no central command. In addition to the local groups, the Arab Liberation Army (ALA), and Arab volunteer force, entered Palestine in 1947 under the command of Fawzi al-Qawuqji. The absence of a Palestinian unity of command was taken advantage of when the Hagana and its allies launched a nationwide offensive called Plan Dalet, which connected several Jewish-inhabited areas and displaced hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. There was a division between the local forces and the ALA. When ‘Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni, the most universally respected Palestinian commander, begged for more military supplies from the ALA, al-Qawuqji denied him. Al-Qawuqji was starting to fall under King ‘Abdullah’s influence. King ‘Abdullah of Transjordan invaded Mandate territory in May 15, 1948, alongside Syria, Egypt, and Iraq. King ‘Abdullah, who was in command of the strongest Arab army involved in the war, was motivated by his interests in adding some of the former Mandate territory to his kingdom. He had negotiated with Britain and the Jewish Agency, and during the war the Transjordanian army only fought Israeli troops in Jerusalem and land assigned to the Arab state.
In reiteratring what everyone else said... the Yishuv and the soon to be Jewish state was very well equiped and prepared; the Palestinians: well, not so much. Khalidi in ch. 4 states that the Palestinians were not well equiped, not prepared, were divided and did not have effective leadership.
ReplyDeleteKhadili brings up a very interesting point in ch. 4. He states emphatically that the Zionists during 1947 to 1949 had much help from Europeans Powers. For example, Khalidi says that the Yishuv got equipment and guns from the Czechs. Strange, but true. Sadly, for the Palestinians, they did not get any equipment from European Powers.
The Palestinians did get some assistance from very few Arab nations like Transjordan. Even the help though King Abullah of Transjordan was outwardly helping the Palestinians, he was duelistic and had many alterior motives. The Arab nations were more concerned about their own security than the Palestinian cause. There were no nations that wanted to help Palestine out of pure kindness.
Even within the Palestinians themselves, there were factions. Those who wanted the war to be faught in one way and those who favored an alternative strategy.
Overall, the Palestinians were inferior to the Zionists in terms of equipment, weapons, resources, wealth, leadership, etc. Therefore, it is no wonder that the Zionist were victorious over the Palestinians.
When discussing the war of 1948, which was a war between Israel and its Arab neighbors, many things can be identified that led to the Israeli victory. Yes, there are many reasons that caused the war but to answer the question of how Israel established victory one needs to look further past the causality of the war. The was seemed to not be in favor for Israel when looking at the fact that Israel had been fight forces from Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan. Taking a look at what types of things wins wars between foes such as the size of each army, the amount of casualties lost on each side, strategic operations, and many others.
ReplyDeleteIsrael won the war in 1948 because the state ultimately had more people fighting including villagers in some cases ( estimated 150,000 troops), Israel had better leadership (Ben-Gurion), Israel had far less casualties then its enemy, and the Arab forces lost large amounts of land (Egypt for example and Syria). Many important strategic operations in the war lead to the Israeli victory. Such operations include Dani-Dakkel that led to the capture of a large international airport, Operation Yoav which gained much land for the Israeli in the Negev desert, and operation Hiram which would gain lands from Syria in the North. Israel has been known to have an estimated six to seven thousand casualties and the Arabs estimated from six thousand to fifteen thousand. When compared, Israel suffered less life’s lost.
Overall, when looking at basic facts that win wars, one can see that the difference between Israel and the Arabs in casualties, troop strength, leadership, along with strategy which all added up to establish Israeli victory in 1948. This is not to say that the causalities of this war did not play any role of Israeli victory however, the previously statements argues that troop count, casualty count, leadership, land, and strategy that happen during war time is the what can be explained in the Israeli victory in 1948.
When examining the reasons for Israeli success and Arab failure in the War of 1948, it is evident that because of the power the Jewish community had gained throughout the 1936-39 rebellion and beyond, the newly established state of Israel had somewhat of an upper hand in the war. What is most intriguing to me, however, is that despite the support from Arab states outside of Palestine, Arabs were unable to rally enough support nor gain enough strength to ultimately overcome Jewish forces. Obviously even while the Palestinians had the support of the broader Arab community, the number of troops sent to Palestine by Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon combined reached a mere 25,000 (Kramer 316). Not only was this number less than the Jewish forces, but the soldiers from these five Arab states were ill-equipped and inadequately trained for effective warfare. According to Kramer, “Over the course of the war, the number of Arab regular soldiers increased considerable, but in terms of motivation, education, and equipment, they could not measure up to the Israeli army” (Kramer 316). Additionally, the Jordanian forces, rather than fighting for Palestine, instead hoped to conquer the UN allotted Palestinian land for Jordan. Arab leadership continued to flounder despite attempts to reestablish itself, specifically through the Arab League. In fact, in September 1948, the Arab League determined to establish an All Palestine Government; however, its efforts were unsuccessful due to inadequate funds and lack of military power (Kramer 318). Ultimately, it was the lack of central leadership, disunity among Arab forces, and insufficient funds that led to the demise of the Arabs. The success of the Jews, on the other hand, can be pointed to extreme unification post-WWII, flourishing economics, severe intimidation tactics, and strong central leadership.
ReplyDeleteThe Yishuv/Israel was capable of winning the War of 1948 because it had greater structure, organization, defense, vision, and unity than the Palestinians and Arab neighbors. Politically, Jewish organizations had been established and internationally recognized and had been taking progressive steps to build a Jewish society. Militarily, the Jews had greater experience with combat cohesion and organization from their military background in the Ha-haganah. The Jewish paramilitary, as Kramer points out, also had received training and weaponry from the British military during the Mandate period (301). Ideology, the Jewish populace, both inside and outside of Palestine, was driven by the common ambition and yearning to create a Jewish state.
ReplyDeleteThe Palestinians were significantly weaker in these areas. After the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 the Arab leadership was dispersed and Palestinians were wounded economically and politically by their rebellion. During the clashes between Palestinians and Jews a few months prior to the 1948 War, the Palestinians were divided into factions and were unsuccessful in orchestrating military cooperation. In addition, they did not have the military training or organization that was characteristic of the Jewish forces. The international Arab resistance to Israel had a division of motives and lack of trust that plagued them from working together to defeat Israel. Kramer blames their inability to collective coordinate on the personal interests and Arab rivalries between the Israel’s Arab neighbors (317). The Palestinians and Arab countries inability to perform as a team to capture a single goal led to their defeat in 1948.
Several factors played a significant part in why the Yishuv won and the Arab forces lost. These factors range from education, infrastructure, support, and military training. Arab society was devastated in the 1930s, mostly from the Arab Revolt, which hurt its own people. Kramer discusses the prosperity of the Jews during WWII and how the Yishuv's infrastructure grew significantly, including education and the creation of local organizations. During WWII, the Mufti was seen as being associated with the Nazis, therefore received no sympathy from Western states.
ReplyDeleteOne of the leading factors of why the Yishuv won was due to support from the West. The Yishuv was favored by the British, and also received modern arms shipments from Czechoslovakia, with Soviet permission. Some wonder how a newly formed state could crush the armies of invaders from nations that have existed for much longer. The Haganah had much experience and training, especially during WWII. They helped the free French forces take back Syria from the Vichy French and had to fight off other small revolts.
The beginning of the 1948 War saw Arab resistance mostly consisting of guerilla forces, with the IDF playing a defensive role. The turning point in the war was when Plan D was put into action and the IDF began to go on the offensive. Due to the IDF's training and advanced weaponry, the Arab forces were no match. Unlike the Yishuv, which had high morale and was fighting for an idea finally coming to life, the Arab forces were not unified. All of these factors, together, greatly contributed to why the Arab forces lost and the state of Israel was finally established.
Times were hard for the Arab Palestinians. Kramer points out that “unemployment, inflation, supply shortages, and rising criminality sharpened the sense of crisis among the Arab population” (p.311). 75,000 well off middle and upper class Arabs left the mixed cities of Haifa, Jaffa and Jerusalem within the first few months of fighting. They fled into the hills and into neighboring Arab countries. This “un-mixing” of the populations had positive effects for the Jews; Jerusalem was in 1948 more Jewish than it had been since 70 A.D. The Arabs were made to leave the Arab Quarter so Jews could be moved in instead. The Jews had the upper hand in population and morale at this point.
ReplyDeleteThe Jews had the Hagana, an organized force that carried out both offensive and defensive operations. An example of their more guerilla like missions is Plan D in March 1948 where the Hagana were to pacify zones between Jewish settlements and create a clear path to Jerusalem, which they did by “nothing less than the capitulation, elimination, or expulsion of their Arab inhabitants, as well as the destruction of their houses, villages, and businesses” (Kramer p.312). The Hagana helped the Israelis in winning against the Arab Palestinians as they were organized in their missions of getting rid of the Arabs and spreading fear amongst them.
It was also important that the Jewish troops were better motivated, educated, had better morale and equipment than the Arabs who, although they had some artillery, were not up to par with their opponent. It is due to all these factors that Israel beat the Arabs in the war of 1948.
I agree mostly with the above comment. Yet, I strongly disagree that you could call Plan D a "guerilla like mission..." Guerrilla warfare is the type of fighting where a small, less-capable military uses the element of surprise to attack, then quickly retreats. Plan D was well thought out by Ben-Gurion and the Haganah commanders. Also, the Israelis were a very well armed and trained force and had no need for guerrilla attacks. However, I do understand that guerrilla warfare is not always necessarily used by smaller forces. It is simply that Plan D had well thought out goals and transformed the Israeli military. Eventually, Plan D turned the tide of the war and put the Israelis in a strategic position to succeed.
ReplyDeleteThe Yishuv, as has clearly been stated by previous comments, had a definite advantage through their unity and organization. The Palestinians were undergoing serious political disarray due to the termination of the British Mandate. While ideally they might have been able to rely on neighboring countries for support, Palestinians were without this option due to the similar disorder these countries were facing as Colonialism came to a rapid halt. The Jews, on the other hand, were generally unaffected by the change occurring at the time because many of them were recent immigrants without any sort of preconceived notion as to what “normal” ought to look like.
ReplyDeleteIt also seems that the Arabs missed an important opportunity in refusing to cooperate with the United Nation’s General Assembly, as this decision isolated them and greatly reduced sympathies toward their cause.
In terms of actual combat, the Arabs became so stratified across the land as they sought refuge that they were unable to successfully unify to fight the Jews. Also, the Jews had significant stores of weapons and had maintained an army for some time by this point, thus giving them a clear advantage militaristically. They also boasted support from Stalin and American sympathizers which provided them with the necessary funds to amplify their military (particularly after conscription became mandatory). It seems that a lack of organization continued to be the Arab’s biggest downfall.
Reiterating all of the previous posts, the Israelis won the 1948 war because they were stronger, better equipped, better organized, and had the support of more powerful nations. On the other hand, the Palestinians were weaker, ill-equipped, fractured, and they lacked support from powerful nations. However, according to Khalidi, the state which the Palestinians were in was intentionally caused by the British. While the Palestinians suffered before the Arab Revolts and were kept from creating a central leadership in order to prevent the Arabs who outnumbered the Jews from taking over; after the Arab Revolts, the British did more to punish the Palestinians and to ensure that they would remain weak and beyond repair. Also, thanks to the Mufti’s relations with Germany, Western powers refused to help or support the Palestinians.
ReplyDeleteAlso, according to Khalidi, because many of the Arab states which became involved in the war were newly independent states, their governments and militaries were weak. As such, many of the Arab states were seeking the support of western states and thus were fractured in regards to whether to support the Palestinians. Furthermore, of the states which entered the war, there was little coordination and planning. Also, because they differed in intent, so did their strategies. For instance, Khalidi points out that Transjordanian and Iraqi forces limited the zones in which they fought to the area which the U.N. proclaimed should be Arab and to Jerusalem which was meant to be religiously neutral due to its status as a holy site for all monotheistic religions.
Even if the Arab states would have won the 1948 war however, I would be hesitant to assume that the Palestinians would have their own state or a state which would withstand the pressures of Israel and the Arab nations because Khalidi mentioned that, it was planned and assumed that Transjordan would take over the Arab partition. Furthermore, the Israelis were determined to expand their boundaries and the Palestinians would have either way been pushed out of the Arab partition.
Even before the declaration of independence of Israel in 1948, the Israelis had an army formed, ready to fight for their independence, and their organization was key in their eventual success in the War of 1948. The Palestinians did have the Arab league, but the organization and forces were much less defined, because the Yishuv had worked hard to maintain a unified Jewish front, which was apparent in the coordinated leadership that the Jews had during the time. Though the Arabs did eventually find a leadership and organization, it was too late because the Yishuv had been preparing their army prior to the war. After the Arab Revolt failed at the end of 1939, their leadership was even more flawed, while the Jews had been strengthened economically by the opening up of job positions while the Arabs were on strike. Jewish immigration had slowed because of the British mandates, but illegal immigration had remained steady throughout the limitations.
ReplyDeleteAll of this work led to the Jews being united, and when they combined that with the experience and organization of the Hagana (and then the IDF), they were far better equipped to be fighting than the Palestinians and the neighbors of Israel who were on the side of the Arabs in the War of 1948. Great Britain didn’t fight in the war, but Israel had their support and the support of the majority of the countries from the west. The internal work by the Yishuv during WWII helped Israel succeed in this war, and retain their newly claimed independence.
One of the reasons why Israel won and Palestine lost the war of 1948 is, the fact that Palestine was weakened military, politically and economically after the crushing of the 1936-39 Arab revolt by Israel, whereas in parallel, Israel had been reinforced in these fields. Therefore, the failure of the Arab revolt decreased the ability of the Palestinians to fight afterwards. Khalidi points out some drawbacks of the Palestinians, namely the limited financial means to wage war, the failure of their leadership, the absence of structures of State. Indeed, the Arabs had difficulties coordinating strategy because of a lack of unity between them, and they did not trust the Mufti. Militarily, the Zionists were more organized, had more weapons, were more trained and outnumbered the Palestinians. As Khalidi stated, the Israelis were 50 000 whereas the Palestinians were only 10 000 which is unequal. Another factor that Khalidi points out is the death of Abd al Qadir Al-Husayni on battle who was the Arabs' most gifted military leader and an important unifying figure. His death led to the loss of strategic cities and Arab villages, and resulted to an increase of casualties on the Arab side. Also, the Palestinians lost the international support such as the US and the Soviet Union because the Mufti was associated with Nazism following his meeting with Hitler in 1941. As a result, the international support was directed to Israel instead and the British became pro-Jewish. In addition to that, Israel had the support of the Hagana, who was trained by the British during the revolt which added an asset to the Israelis that the Palestinian did not benefit from. To put it in a nutshell, The Palestinians lost the war of 1948 because they were disadvantaged compared with the Israelis in many fields.
ReplyDeleteIn response to Weizmann’s comment, it is true that the Arab community in Palestine had self-inflicted economic hardship upon themselves during their three year revolt, but with the outbreak of World War II, the war demands helped to stimulate some prosperity back into the Palestinian economy. According to Gudrun Kramer in her book, A History of Palestine, more goods were being produced locally and substituting for foreign imports, which increased food supplies in the region. The demands during the war for, “food, industrial commodities, and services…benefited Arab peasants, craftsmen, and businessmen who had suffered economically during the Arab Revolt” (299). The debt burden of peasants also decreased with the inflation during the war years. Although the Palestinians were still economically inferior to their Jewish neighbors, the Palestinian economy was not exactly the same almost eight years later when the conflict between Palestinians and Jews escalated precluding to the 1948 war.
ReplyDeleteThe Yishuv and the Hagana did receive foreign support through weaponry supplies and training, which contributed to the Jewish victory during the 1948 war. However, I think the lack of organization and unified planning between the Arab countries during the war played an essential part in the IDF’s ability to defend Israel during the assaults. The Arab countries were divided in the war-front and after their own national gains. Had they put their personal agendas aside and united as one, they would have had a better chance to overwhelm Israel; although I am reluctant to say that they would have defeated IDF.
The Yishuv/Israel won the war because they were better equipped, organized, and were united by a strong ideology and national identity. Conversely, the Palestinians were ill-equipped, suffered from fractured and weak leadership. Unlike Israel, the Palestinians received little help from Europe, and the assistance Arab countries provided the Palestinians was not enough to change the outcome of the war.
ReplyDeleteAccording to Khalidi, consequences of the Arab Revolt of 1936-39 severely weakened the Palestinian cause. Many of the revolt’s leaders were arrested or killed, leaving the Palestinians without a strong, cohesive leadership. Also, neither the U.S., nor any European state provided the Palestinians with military equipment. While lack of support for the Palestinians from Europe or America may have been supplemented by support from their Arab neighbors, this was not the case. The Arab countries had their own motives, many Arab states were reluctant to jeopardize their relations with the rest and were unwilling to sacrifice their own security for the Palestinian people.
The Yishuv, however, benefited from British training, and modern military equipment received from other European states. Furthermore, Zionism united their leadership and the military. Also, the Arab revolt provided the Yishuv the opportunity to become more self-sufficient, thus creating the groundwork for Israeli statehood.
Much of the outcome of the War of 1948 was determined before the war even began. The Palestinians had been crushed in the Arab Revolt (1936-1939). Palestinians faced exile, deportation, jail, imprisonment, or execution. The male population of fighting age was greatly decreased. Most of the casualties were the people with the most military experience. Homes and crops were destroyed (along with the Palestinian sector of the economy). The Yishuv recognized the Arab Revolt as an opportunity to help the British and encourage and hopefully win their support. The Yishuv “joined the fight” (Khalidi 109) helping the British, which resulted in valuable military training and arms from the Brits.
ReplyDeleteLater, in WWII, the Yishuv continued their helpfulness. Although they weren’t allowed to fight directly for the Allies, men and women were enlisted and recruited to help the Allies whenever possible (arms smuggling, military and intelligence, linguistics, land knowledge, etc.). Despite not actively fighting until the war was almost over, the Yishuv did everything possible to be organized for whatever they might be allowed to do (creating and running a radio station, news service, newspaper, and standing army, all underground, of course). This organization put them miles ahead when the War of 1948 came. Jewish Americans were also helping by raising funds and holding conventions and lobby meetings that stressed the importance of a Jewish homeland.
Hagana, Irgun, and Lehi’s activities pre-1948 also provided opportunities for more training that would prove beneficial during the War of 1948.
Kramer offers that although the Arabs were not entirely unprepared, they were just “insufficiently coordinated” (Kramer 308). The collection of Arab states were unified in the aim of preventing the Jews from taking possession of the UN partition plan territories, but they didn’t agree on how to do that. Their highest priority, as Kramer puts it, was to ensure that “none of their rivals would gain more than they did themselves” (Kramer 309). It was never personal for them to protect Palestine. They were just selfishly helping their neighbors while hoping and planning to make it worth their while.
Finally, the Yishuv had superior equipment. When one takes into account the experience, training, organization, numbers, vision, motivation, and equipment differences, it’s no wonder the Yishuv was successful in creating Israel, their new Jewish homeland.
Before the outbreak of the war, the Jewish settlers had built up organized Jewish militias into a disciplined and well-armed force, the Hagana, which had received Czech weapons and had been involved in several conflicts, though not on that scale.
ReplyDeleteThe Arab revolt had left the surrounding nations' militaries weak and economies feeble. Their armies had not unified leadership and lacked the moral conviction that the defense of Zionism brought to the Israelis.
The Yishuv won because they were better organized, unified, and supported internationally. Since the second and third aliyot, Jews in Israel had been forming a state within a state. The Yishuv set up political institutions with a leadership that had for the most part common goals. This made organizing militarily easier. It also gave the Yishuv the ability to be better represented abroad, especially in Western Europe and the United States. The political, territorial, and social unity among Jews living in Palestine was unparalleled by the Arab Palestinian community. A Jewish national identity was established in Europe and reaffirmed through Herzl’s Zionism but Arab nationalism was still developing despite the attempts made during World War 1. International support of Zionist goals and the government in Eretz Yisrael helped the Yishuv win the war of 1948 and obtain territory and international recognition of a Jewish state. Lobbies of wealthy Jews in Western Europe and America as well as guilt about the Holocaust helped to persuade governments to support a Jewish state. All of these things combined to make Israel a formidable enemy against the Arab coalition.
ReplyDeleteComment on Katie Jensen's post (May 10, 2011):
ReplyDeleteI completely agree with Katie that the support of international powers, organization, and strong national identity caused Israel rather than Palestine to win the war. I would also add that the British’s role in Palestine negatively influenced their performance in the war of 1948. Katie mentioned that the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939 weakened the Palestinian cause by destroying much of the leadership that would have potentially led the nation in the 1948 war. Obviously, negative feelings towards the British presence in Palestine played a significant role in initiating the revolt. One contributor to these negative feelings was the installation of the mufti of Jerusalem that Philip Mattar discusses in his article for the Middle East Journal. Muhammad Amin al-Husayni was Mufti of Jerusalem, a position created by the British as essentially a figurehead of the Arab population in Palestine. Al-Husayni led the Arab Revolt against the British that led the British to crack down on the Arab Council. Also, during the Arab Revolt, the British trained the Haganah and relied on them for assistance in fighting the Palestinians, exacerbating the tension between the Yishuv and the Arab Palestinians as well as giving the Haganah invaluable training that would be implemented in the 1948 war.
Comment on Lauren Kerner's post:
ReplyDeleteLauren makes a good point that the neighboring Arab countries were all undergoing the same transition out of colonialism. The Jewish immunity to change is an interesting point to make. I disagree with her that the Palestinians missed an opportunity by passing up on the Partition Plan of 1947. As the articles from this week highlight, the Western world was disproportionately positive towards Israel and negative towards Palestine. The Partition Plan of 1947 unjustly divided the land, giving 40-45% of the land to the 1.3 million Palestinians and 55% of the land to the 650,000 Jews. If the Palestinians had accepted the Partition Plan of 1947 and “cooperated” with the United Nations they would have sustained significant losses in their campaign for equal and fair treatment with Israel that continues today.
Comment on Christopher Reese's post:
ReplyDeleteChristopher’s short account of Israel’s success and the Arab’s failures highlights some interesting points but does not address some key issues in the war of 1948. It is true that the Haganah’s training starkly contrasted the Palestinian’s scattered militias but Christopher neglects to mention the British influence on this military training. I would also be interested in hearing more about the Czech weapons that Israel received during the war. Leadership in the Arab military resistance was crucial but I think that political leadership was more important in determining the failure of the Arab states against Israel. Strong political leadership among Palestinians and unified action with other Arab nations could have possibly prevented the problems of settlement and eventually the war of 1948.
http://www.historynet.com/lashing-back-israel-1947-1948-civil-war.htm
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