Sunday, February 13, 2011

Question of the week: the Husayn-McMahon correspondence

The Husayn-McMahon correspondence of 1915-16, at the time a secret correspondence between Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, and Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca - the letters were made public years later, in 1938 - were one of the most controversial promises the British had ever made. In a sense, the letters provided the basis for what could have been fruitful relationship between the British (who wished to dominate the Middle East), the Arabs (who wanted to see the Ottomans go), and Husayn and his family (who had personal ambitions). As it turned out, the British never fulfilled their promise to establish an Arab state, but rather pursued a policy that would make the Balfour Declaration a reality. So our question is:


What did the British in fact offer Husayn, why were their promises problematic, and who should be blamed for the eventual result of affairs at the end of the World War I? Did the Jews play any role in shifting British policy? If so, why weren't the Arabs successful in doing the same?


A big and long question - does anyone care to answer?

18 comments:

  1. Britain essentially offered Husayn support of an independent Arab state in exchange for their revolt against the Ottoman Empire. The problems of this exchange and the promises it made are many. First, it was not legally binding because many of the terms, including the governing of areas such as Lebanon and Baghdad, were left unresolved with the intention of discussing them at a later date. This in addition to the creation of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration made the promises of the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence contradictory and incredible. Also, Husayn spoke of the creation of an “Arab” independent state, meaning the peoples who ethnically and linguistically shared the name Arab. McMahon’s definition of “Arab” referred distinctly to Muslims and thus defined areas that were “not purely Arab,” or those areas that contained Christians or Jews, as separate from the agreements of the correspondence. This miscommunication in particular makes the promises concerning the area of Palestine especially unclear.

    I think both parties are to blame for the results after World War I but if I had to choose one, I would say the British were more at fault. By engaging in these correspondences, they did agree at least in some effect to support of Arab independence. Knowing that, they secretly formed the Sykes-Picot Agreement and then made the Balfour Declaration. The Husayn-McMahon correspondence seen from the other side of World War I is a blatant manipulation of Arabs to aid in dissolving the Ottoman Empire through the promise of independence, a promise that, judging by their later actions, the British most likely did not intend to keep.

    I think the main difference between the ability of Jews and Arabs to influence Western powers was the fact that most of the Jews involved in the Zionist movement were Westerners. The Jews shared society and language with Westerners while the Arabs were foreigners whose political and social presence was not strongly felt in Europe. The Jews were successful at shifting British policy through the influence of Chaim Weizmann on Prime Minister David Lloyd George who came into power in December 1916. Less than a year later, the Balfour Declaration was released. Support among the elites of Great Britain and France because of the Biblical significance of Palestine aided the cause of Zionism as well.

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  2. McMahon (representing Britain) offered the Arab people a multitude of eventual disappointments through his correspondence with Husain. Though there was obvious incentive for Husayn – whom was promised a leadership position in this new Arab Nation - the most detrimental aspects of this agreement lie in the both the territorial divisions that were, at best, alluded to, and the British insistence that they would recognize an independent Arab state should a revolt against the Ottomans come to fruition. As far as the cession of land is concerned, McMahon was intentionally vague in his declaration that “The districts of Mersina and Alexandretta, and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo” were to be excluded from the Arab’s portion because they could not be defined as “purely Arab”. As Kramer touches on in her book, the miscommunication between McMahon and Husayn as it pertained to the word “Arab” had detrimental outcomes in how each party interpreted the agreement. Furthermore, the exclusion of Palestine from this exchange does raise certain questions.

    Nevertheless, Britain did undeniably make certain pledges to the Arab people that they obviously conflicted with other commitments. Britain seemed to be either more concerned with extending their sphere of influence than maintaining relationships with allies or they so concerned with being popular that they didn’t know how to say “no.” Either way, they found themselves in quite a bind with the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 that divvied up the Middle East between Britain and France. However, this Agreement was also willing to acknowledge a free Arab state which is a breath of fresh air when compared with its successor, the Balfour Declaration. This declaration completely undermined both prior agreements by issuing a decree that was in total contradiction.

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  3. (Continued)

    Interestingly enough, it seems that the failures on the part of the Arabs are actually not that dissimilar to the failures on the part of the British. The Arabs failed to mobilize and unify their people. Given the monumental change that their home was undergoing at the time, it’s no real surprise that they had a difficult time doing so. The Jews were already established, already zealous for their cause, and already financed. Someone had to take power from the Ottomans. The Jews were able to take advantage of an opportunity. Furthermore, because they represent both a people and a religion, they were not confined to a specific location, as were the Arabs. The Jews were able to shift policy merely because they had a presence where the policymakers were. Herein lies the problem with the British: They weren’t prepared to handle the vastness of land and culture at their disposal. They had no experience with Arab culture and they were unable to maintain a centralized means of ruling their kingdom because they had become too spread apart. It seems that at the time of the Balfour Declaration, they were in search of a solution, having realized that perhaps ruling Palestine was not in their best interest. Also, sending Jewish people there provided a solution to rising anti-Semitic sentiment. In this way, the Jews did influence a shift in British policy due to presence and experience. Because they were westernized, the British could hand the baton to them without feeling a total loss of control, as they might have if the McMahon-Husayn correspondence had come to be. The British are at fault for their dishonesty. However, the Arabs’ lack of initiative also makes one question whether or not they were truly prepared for independence. At the end of the day, the blame falls in the hands of the British for their scrambled communication and blatant disregard for treatises and allies.

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  4. In return for an Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire, the British promised to recognize an independent Arab caliphate, which Husayn, the Sharif of Mecca, would rule over. However, the land which was to be under Arab-control was ambiguously defined by the British. At the time of the correspondence, rational choice encouraged the British to form a secret deal with Husayn, but with the outbreak of the war the British sought new opportunities that caused their former promises to Husayn to become problematic. The secret Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 and the Balfour Declaration of 1917 contradicted the former promise with Husayan. The former ignored Arab autonomy and the latter supported a Jewish homeland in Palestine. These poor administrative decisions made by the British should make them accountable for the outcome of events at the end of the war. On the other hand, Husayan showed equally poor administrative abilities by not requesting greater clarity over the land boundaries and a legally binding contract.
    The Jews political organizations and influential representatives appealed to British policy. Why wouldn’t the British choose the more stable option? The Jews were political mobilized, financially secured, and shared similar cultural and social constructions as the British, which was not the case for the Arabs.

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  5. Britain was tied up in so many promises with the Zionists, Arabs and others that they failed to meet almost any of their promises. Husayn and the Arabs felt double-crossed and cheated by the British at the end of WWI.

    Like some of my classmates said earlier: One reason might possibly be that McMahon and Husayn had very different definition of "Arab." Kramer also mentioned this all important fact in her book. Unfortunately for the Arabs and Husayn their definition ultimately lost.... I think that no one is really to blame, but the British should be blamed if anyone is to blame for the Arabs not getting Palestine. McMahon promised Palestine to Husayn in the correspondence of so Husyan says.... no one will really ever no for sure.

    The Jews did not, themselves have a lot of influence on the British's ultimate decision but they did heavily lobby in London which help them to persuade the British some. The Arabs though, did not have as much money, resources or people lobby for them, unfortunately. Also, the British were mostly Christian and used The Bible to justify that the Jews were the "Chosen People" and that they not the Arabs needed to occupy the "Promised Land." In the end, the Jews won possession of what would become Israel, after the British and other western powers felt that the Jews should get the land.

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  6. In the Husayn-McMahon correspondence, the British offered Husayn the independence of Arab countries and recognition of caliphate. The offer itself is problematic; as Amanda pointed, Husayn and McMahon conceptualized the definition of "Arab" differently. The boundaries and governance of the proposed Arab state were at best vaguely described by McMahon, and the land west of the Jordan were excluded from the offer. The description of the correspondence in Krämer says that not all of the offers made by McMahon were approved by London. In addition to problems internal to the correspondence itself, there were many external problems. In May 1916, just after the end of Husayn-McMahon correspondence, Britain and France made the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which would have placed Haifa, Acre, and most of Iraq under British control and Cilicia and the Syrian coastline to France. The majority of Palestine would be under control of a joint Russian/French/British administration. These demarcations clearly overlap and contradict the promises made to Husayn. The Balfour Declaration, which grants to the Jewish people a "national home" in Palestine, further complicates the matter.

    I think that the if any one side should be blamed for the state of affairs it should be the British. Arab leaders, such as Husayn and Faisal, were at a disadvantage when dealing with the British because many of the British actions were done clandestinely (e.g. the Syke-Picot Agreement). The correspondence with Husayn wasn't "official" yet gave the intention that it was binding, at least in Husayn's view.

    I believe that the Jews did play a role in shifting British policy. They actively lobbied in several European capitals (such as London and Paris) and worked from within the political bureaucracies to support their cause. However, the seemingly "pro-Zionist" flavor of the British administration obscures the fact that much of their policies could have been motivated from self-interest in the area. I feel that the Arabs couldn't have been as effective as the Jews because of a couple of reasons. To begin with, the Jews were familiar with European governments and sensibilities (as Amanda and Amy have mentioned already), whereas the Arabs have only had experience working within the Ottoman Empire (and usually though "notables"). This can be seen by the fact that the British never officially recognized Palestinian delegations, even though they presented their case in London several times.

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  7. Within the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, British High Commissioner of Egypt McMahon informed Husayn that the British would support the establishment of an independent Arab state; however, no specific boundaries were outlined by the British. This then resulted in a great deal of confusion for Husayn and the Arab people. For how can one go about furthering the establishment of an independent state without the specified territory. (Had it been a few decades down the road, Husayn could have taken a lesson from the Zionists and simply attempted to buy up as much land as possible for his prospective independent state.)

    The shift in British policy most likely was influenced by Jewish leaders, but I do not think it was strictly Zionist ideas that led to an overall change in policy. When McMahon agreed to support the creation of an Arab state under Husayn, he did so while under the impression that the Ottoman Empire might be a threat to British interest. So his support of Arab Palestinians, in all likelihood, was more so a preventive measure against the Ottoman Empire.

    As the war continued, however, and the dissolve of the Ottoman Empire became inevitable, the British became much less weary of the Ottomans and consequently didn’t see supporting Arab Palestinians as crucial to its national interests. In the mean time, Zionist leaders had organized and been in communication with many British officials in Britain. It must be noted that while McMahon did secede supposed support to Husayn, he did so while being X number of miles away from Parliament, who would ultimately have to agree to the decision.

    The Arab population was not as successful in rallying support around its cause, simply because it was not well-organized. There was a lack of solid leadership seeking to follow through with the establishment of an Arab state in Palestine. While Husayn attempted to do so, his interests were more so personal than simply because he loved the Arab Palestinian people.

    I do find it interesting that the British supported the Zionists in this case. I suppose because the Arab Palestinians were less organized and more easily dominated, the British would have been more content to simply put a High Commissioner in power who would just seek to further British interests. But instead, the British chose to support a group that was more organized, a group that obviously had very specific interests of its own. Perhaps this was due to the vast influx of Jews in western Europe due to persecution in eastern Europe. As awful as it may sound, perhaps the reality is that the British too, like most of Europe, wanted to help the Jews establish a homeland because they simply didn’t want a Jewish presence in Britain either.

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  8. McMahon, representing the British, offered Husayn the role of leadership over the new Arab nation that was to be created, in exchange for his support against the Ottoman Empire. The problems with the promises that McMahon made was that the British and Husayn had different views on what ‘Arab’ meant. Husayn thought of ‘Arab’ as meaning the people who shared the language and ethnicity of the Arab people, while McMahon meant Muslims and hence the agreement according to him did not include areas that were “not purely Arab”. It is difficult to say who should be blamed for the eventual results, as they were both part of the vague agreement, which should have been more specific. But I guess the British can be blamed to a larger extent since they clearly did not intend to keep the promises they made of supporting the creation of an independent Arab state, and simply used that promise to secure the aid they needed. The Jews may have been able to play a larger role in influencing British policy since they were more organized, had institutions and shared a more common background with the British since they had been present in Europe. The Arabs were not as successful in shifting the policy because they did not have the same benefits.

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  9. The British offered Husayn their support for an independent Arab state (of which Husayn would act as caliphate) in exchange for the support of the Arab population in expelling the Ottomans. However, the British stipulated that they would only support the Arab state, as long as their support would not cause conflict between any of Great Britain’s allies. Also, Kramer points out that the British and Arabs differed in how they each defined an “Arab.” Husayn and many Arabs define an Arab as someone who was from the region or practiced the culture, while the British believed that to be Arab meant one was Muslim. These differing interpretations complicated the promises made by the British, because the British specified that areas that were not completely dominated by Arabs would be excluded from an independent Arab state.

    While both sides are responsible for resulting events at the end of WWI, I agree with my classmates that the British should be held more accountable for the outcome than the Arabs. The British made a commitment to Husyan to support an independent state, however Britain’s future actions would reveal that their fidelity to the Husyan-McMahon agreements were insincere. Through the issuance of the Balfour Declaration, and their involvement in the Sykes-Picot agreement, the British eliminated any chance for an independent Arab state. If the British genuinely wished to help the Arabs establish an independent state, then they would not have divided up the Middle East between themselves and France.

    The Jews played a significant role in shifting British policy, mainly through their ability to lobby members of the British parliament and the connection many Zionists already had with Europe. The Arabs, however, were unable to develop an alternative to Zionism, and were unclear in their objectives.

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  10. The British offered Husayn a leadership role of an independent Arab state which would exclude those areas where Non-Muslim Arabs lived. Also, the British offered recognition of a caliphate and protection for Holy Places within the boundaries that would be located within the Arab state. Furthermore, the British offered be an ally and advisor to the Arab State without imposing on the state’s sovereignty.
    These promises were problematic for several reasons. To begin with, Husayn disagreed with McMahon about where the future Arab state’s boarders should lie. Husayn believed that Mersina, Alexandretta, and the western portions of Syria that McMahon wanted to exclude from the Arab state since the inhabitants were not Muslim should be a part of the Arab state because the inhabitants spoke Arabic and were ethnically Arab. Thus, Husayn and McMahon never came to an agreement regarding this issue.
    These promises were also problematic because not all of the promises McMahon made were approved by the British government. In fact, as Kramer points out and the Sykes-Picot Agreement shows, Britain’s intended involvement with the Arabs was not for the betterment of the Arabs, but to extend European control. The correspondence, therefore, seems to have been merely a device used by the British to gain Arab trust.
    Another reason McMahon’s promises were problematic is that during WWI, as evidenced by the Balfour Declaration, the British were becoming less supportive of Arabs and more supportive of Jews. The Jews did in fact play a significant role in the shifting British policy, though. The Jews were successful at lobbying for British support. The Arabs, on the other hand, lacked a recognized central leadership and distrusted British attempts to seek the input of Arabs. This distrust, however, was not solely felt by the Arabs. Due to the mixed messages Britain was giving both the Arabs and Jews, both sides felt betrayed by the British and conflicts which the British may have been able to prevent or lessen were exacerbated.
    British, Arab, and Jewish leaders were all are responsible for the resulting conflicts and tensions after WWI but, because Britain was an established and powerful state in comparison to the Jews and Arabs, and because Britain was an outside influence on the situation, the British are, in my opinion, more responsible for the resulting state of affairs.

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  11. The Husayn-McMahon correspondence offered Britain’s support of the independence of Arab countries within certain boundaries, assistance in establishing governments in these territories, and recognition of the caliphate. However, Britain’s promises were problematic because McMahon’s pledge was ambiguous. Kramer contends that it did nothing to clarify the status of Palestine in regards to allocation of land, the scope of its boundaries, and how the state was to be governed. Also, Husayn’s and McMahon’s definition of what it means to be an Arab differed greatly. Husayn thought of Arabs as people who were from the same ethnic background, while McMahon defined Arabs as Muslims. This confusion caused a disagreement in what it meant to be “purely Arab”, which affected how land would be allocated. While one side can never be wholly to blame, I agree with my classmates who argue that the British might deserve more of the blame. McMahon’s pledge seems careless because British commitments in the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, then the Balfour Declaration of 1917 that gave the Jews a home in Palestine, nullified any chance of a Palestinian state promised in the correspondence. While it can be argued that the correspondence at least showed British support for a new Arab state, it definitely seems like the British used the careless correspondence for their own benefit. Also, the correspondence did not receive full support from the British government. However careless the correspondence might have been, it is to be expected that a nation would place its concerns over another. Husayn should have expected this so he could clarify any confusion in regards McMahons promises. Also, the Jews might have been able to play a role in shifting British policy because the British recognized that their institutions and policies were appealing and well organized. This was not the case for the Arabs, who typically lacked stable leadership and any strong political organization.

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  12. Britain was offering Husayn a state for the Arabs, with him in control, as long as the Arabs took the opportunity to revolt against the Ottoman empire under whose control they were at the time. Britain didn’t have the complete power to allocate the lands to the Arabs as a general population, because the lands, which they were referring to, were comprised of many different backgrounds of people. The British (under McMahon’s negotiations in this case) were only referring to the Arab lands to be those that were called home by Muslims, because they only believed Arabs to be such if they spoke a common language and were of that religion. The agreement also put off the decisions and handing over of certain controls to a later, unspecified date. I believe that the British were responsible for the failure of this agreement to be put into place, because I think that their agreements (mainly the Balfour Declaration) after the war were going back on the terms of the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. Many of the interactions of the British and the Arab world during this time were secretive, which made the assurance that the terms of the treaties would be honored a bit unreliable.
    The Jewish lobby at the time was much stronger, there was a strong Jewish presence in Europe, and many of the leaders in Europe believed that the Jews, being more established by western standards in the area at the time, had a more unified system in the area and were therefore better for being more in control of the lands. Though the Arabs had been more numerous before the influx of Jews into the area within the last 50 years, they were late to be able to organize a hierarchy and any sort of unification of the people, which did not look good to the British at the time.

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  13. The British promised the Sharif Husayn of Mecca in the Husayn-Mcmahon correspondence that, if he leads a revolt against the Ottoman empire and obtain independence, the liberated states would belong to the Arabs and would be left independent. However, there were a misunderstanding concerning their respective understanding of whom the Arabs were, and therefore, the lands that should be allocated to them. For the British, the Arabs were only the Muslims whereas, for the Arabs, it was mostly a matter of territory, culture and language rather than faith. This major misunderstanding between Husain and Mcmahon of whom were the Arabs was problematic, because the British did not want to leave the Arabs certain territories, that they considered theirs, since they were not entirely Muslim but rather Christian or Druze. Therefore, as Kramer pointed out, some regions such as Damascus, Homs, Hama Alepo were not granted to the Arabs. This created tensions and conflicts because that resulted to a feeling of betrayal and injustice from the Arabs. The British are the ones to be blamed for according to me because first, they did not respect their promises to the Arabs and second, they just took decisions to defend their interests without thinking of the good of the local population. Indeed, they secretly negotiate with the French to divide and occupy the territory into zones of influence that were supposed to be allotted to the Arabs in Sykes-Picot Agreement in May 1916. Moreover, they also issued the Declaration of Balfour in November 1917 where, the British became fully “committed to the creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine” (Khalidi). The Jews played a role in the shifting of the British policy because contrary to the Arabs they had a small zionist lobby in Britain led by Dr Haim Weizmann who played a role in the issuance of the Balfour Declaration. Nevertheless, the British were also motivated by strategic considerations. The Arabs were not united and not closed enough to the western world to get support from them as opposed to the Jews.

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  14. In 1915 Sir Henry McMahon promised the sharif of Mecca, Husain b. Ali, “control of the whole of areas to be liberated from Turkey” excluding an area West of Syria. McMahon wrote that some areas could not be purely Arab. Husain was thinking in terms of language and culture. McMahon referred to Arabs as Muslims. As one can imagine, this caused some controversy. The promise became known as the McMahon-Husain Correspondence. The problems became problematic because no maps were drawn up, and therefore the boundaries were unclear. So where does this leave Palestine? The Arabs claim that Palestine was part of the land given to the Arabs in the agreement. However, the Zionist disagree. The historical significance of this event is that the Arab and Zionist argument about Palestine still exists today. Every present day conflict reflects on the question of who Palestine belongs to. The agreement was said to be for Arab independence but actually only made arrangements to guarantee French and British interests. The Arabs thought they had been cheated and betrayed by the British, fueling resentment towards Western culture. That resentment still exists today. As many of my classmates have said, the Jews had experience with European government which ended up giving them the upper hand. However, the British are at fault because of their lack of communication, broken promises, and prior commitments. The Arabs are at fault for believing the British would actually keep the promises they made!

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  15. The Husayn-McMahon correspondence was an exchange of letters during Wolrd War I between the British high commissioner in Egypt, Henry McMahon and the sharif of Mecca, Husayn bin Ali. In these letters, the British excluded the “districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and the portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo” (Kramer, 145). from the limits and boundaries of the proposed lot of land for the Arabs. Although this sounded like a worthwhile deal, it contained several flaws. First, the correspondence was not a treaty or an official document. Even though Arab-Palestinians would later claim it contradicted the Balfour Declaration, the correspondence was not legally binding to Britain. Second, it was vague about the partitioning of land. The borders proposed by this correspondence were ambiguous and therefore unable “to be recognized under international law.” (Kramer, 145).
    Two years after the correspondence between Husayn and McMahon, … wrote the Balfour Declaration establishing the land of Palestine as a national home for the Jewish people. This partitioning of the same land to two different parties fueled much conflict that still continues today.
    One could point a blaming finger at the British because they were responsible for making promises and partitioning the same land to two different entities. But what about the Jews? Could they not foresee a conflict and therefore try to meet with all three parties (Jews, Palestinians, and Europeans) to discuss partitioning of land? What of the Arab Palestinians? Were they not aware of the number of affluent Jews residing in places such as Great Britain, America, and France and had more access to the political hierarchies? Could they not see that these two factors in the end provided a bigger role for Jews than for Arab Palestinians in the shift of British policy? Since the Arabs had no union their presence in the Western political sphere was not as strong. In the end, the blame can not just be put on one side, all participants could have done something to prevent the consequences of World War I in Middle Eastern affairs.

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  16. In the Husayn-McMahon Correspondence, Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca and Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, agreed Britain would support and Arab state providing that Husayn led a revolt against the Ottoman Empire to get independence. It later came out that Britain was making agreements not only with the Arabs through Husayn, but also with the Zionists. Britain was effectively playing both sides.
    It is completely understandable that Husayn felt betrayed and double crossed. So who is to blame. Many of my fellow students cite Britain. While I think Britain definitely messed up, they aren’t the only ones that are to blame. There are two main problems I see with placing the blame solely on Britain.
    First, the Husayn-McMahon correspondence did not detail the land in question in enough detail. The areas of land discussed in the correspondences were vague. No maps, latitude and longitude, etc. were used. Arabs believed Palestine was part of the land they would be getting in the agreement, but Zionists believed Palestine wasn’t included. Husayn needed to have clear concise boundaries. This would have been beneficial for garnering international support when the correspondences were made public. International outrage, followed by support for Husayn and the Arabs, would have helped the outcome.
    Second, the correspondences are not considered by Britain to be official documents or treaties, even if the party corresponding on behalf of Britain holds a high ranking position (as McMahon did). Henry McMahon, the British High Commissioner in Egypt, could be seen as making agreements on the part of Britain, but in international affairs and foreign policy the rule is that everything has to as official and spelled out in as much detail as humanly possible if you want an agreement to be considered binding. I’m not convinced that the Arabs knew the complete hierarchy of British government and how to operate in this kind of arena. We’ve discussed in class that the Zionists were much more adept at lobbying and seeing the right people through the right venues because of their familiarity with European government. The Arabs, unfamiliar with the British system, weren’t able to meet with the right people and didn’t go through the right venues. It is important to note that this wasn’t from lack of trying. They couldn’t get meetings with ranking officials who held the power to actually be doing anything for them.

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  17. By 1915, the British had become increasingly interested in Arabia. Acting on behalf of the British Government, Sir Henry McMahon promised Sherif Husayn (Hussein) of Mecca, Arab control over the whole of areas to be liberated from Turkey, except an area to the West of Syria defined as follows:
    "The two districts of Mersina and Alexandretta and portions of Syria lying to the west of the districts of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded."
    and some other minor concessions. The area was only defined approximately.
    No authoritative maps based on this promise were ever published. The origins of the boundary suggested are obscure, and may have had their origin in the instructions of Sir Edward Grey that Damascus, Homs, Hama and Allepo should be under Arab control.
    Both interpretations could be supported by the vague boundary description in the letter, and partisans of the Zionists and Palestinians have produced maps that support their contentions. The Arab claim that Palestine was definitely part of the land assigned to the Arabs is not wholly consistent with the phrase in the letter, which says of the excluded areas "cannot be said to be purely Arab, and should be excluded from the limits demanded. Palestine "could not be said to be purely Arab" in the same sense as the area of modern Lebanon certainly, because, especially in Jerusalem, the Turkish government had given a great many "concessions" to both foreign governments and to church groups. Moreover, there is a British undertaking to safeguard the holy places, which would hardly have been necessary if Palestine was not part of the area. The British later claimed that the Balfour declaration was consistent with the McMahon correspondence and the Sykes-Picot agreement, but the three documents seem to contradict each other

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  18. As stated above, McMahon promised Husayn a leadership position in the eventual Arab state in exchange for assistance in the form of rebellion against the Ottomans. The wording was vague and lacked a cultural understanding that led to a contention of what was promised and the intents of both parties.

    This agreement was problematic because of other pledges that were made later to contradict it. This was a sensible move from the British, using covert agreements to gain support to the end of bringing down the Ottomans. Once the empire was not longer a threat, it was really insignificant who ruled afterwards as long as British influence was still strong. By reaching out and gaining multiple allies, they could hand off the land to whoever was best fit to inherit it. This is enlightened self-interest and taking advantage of the Arab naivety.

    Although the British officials making these arrangements are primarily to blame, the Arab's lack of understand in Western affairs and imperial manipulation is their fault alone. Ethics are irrelevant to those in global power struggles.

    The Jews were able to change policy through a well-trained lobby and having begun crafting the basic organs of a state early. This made them the most reliable party to receive control of the areas after the British mandate ended. They processed the foresight to align themselves with the interest of the element that held all the power.

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